Entitlement-Shifting Rules by Rule, Troy A.
Boston College Law Review 
Volume 62 Issue 4 Article 4 
4-29-2021 
Entitlement-Shifting Rules 
Troy A. Rule 
Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, troy.rule@asu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr 
 Part of the Civil Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real 
Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Troy A. Rule, Entitlement-Shifting Rules, 62 B.C. L. Rev. 1193 (2021), https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/
bclr/vol62/iss4/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College 
Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 




TROY A. RULE 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1194 
I. WHAT ARE ENTITLEMENT-SHIFTING RULES? ........................................................................ 1196 
A. Entitlement Theory: Coase, the Cathedral Model, and Beyond ....................................... 1197 
B. Entitlement-Shifting Rules Defined .................................................................................. 1199 
1. Distinguishing Entitlement Transfers Under Liability Rules from Entitlement-Shifting 
Rules ........................................................................................................................... 1201 
2. “Clarifying” Versus “Shifting” Entitlements ............................................................... 1203 
II. WHEN IS ENTITLEMENT SHIFTING JUSTIFIED? ...................................................................... 1204 
A. Weighing Costs and Benefits ............................................................................................ 1205 
1. Allocative Efficiency Impacts ..................................................................................... 1206 
2. Demoralization Costs .................................................................................................. 1207 
3. Avoided Settlement Costs ........................................................................................... 1209 
B. Justice Considerations ..................................................................................................... 1210 
C. Innocuous Types of Entitlement Shifting .......................................................................... 1213 
D. “Entitlements” Versus “Property Entitlements” ............................................................. 1215 
III. LAWS THAT SHIFT ONE PROPERTY ENTITLEMENT AT A TIME ............................................ 1219 
A. Title-Shifting Rules ........................................................................................................... 1219 
1. Adverse Possession ..................................................................................................... 1220 
2. Civil Asset Forfeiture Laws ......................................................................................... 1222 
B. Title-Terminating Rules ................................................................................................... 1226 
1. Trademark Law’s Genericism Doctrine ....................................................................... 1227 
2. Laws Governing Abandoned Property ......................................................................... 1228 
C. Other Shifts of Single Property Entitlements.................................................................... 1230 
1. Prescriptive Easements ................................................................................................ 1231 
2. Easements Implied by Necessity, Prior Use, or Estoppel ............................................ 1232 
IV. SHIFTING SEVERAL PROPERTY ENTITLEMENTS AT ONCE ................................................... 1233 
A. Laws Designating New Contraband Items ....................................................................... 1236 
B. Intentional Government Flooding of Private Land .......................................................... 1238 
C. Mass Property Entitlement Shifting to Benefit Special Interests ...................................... 1242 
1. Retroactive Extension of Copyright Durations ............................................................ 1243 
2. Attempts to Shift Property Entitlements in Subsurface Pore Space to Mineral Estate 
Holders ....................................................................................................................... 1244 
3. Attempts to Shift Property Entitlements in Low Airspace to Drone Operators ........... 1246 





TROY A. RULE* 
Abstract: This Article describes and analyzes entitlement-shifting rules: laws 
that initially assign a legal “entitlement” to one party and subsequently reassign 
the same entitlement to a different party. Guido Calabresi and Douglas Mela-
med’s classic framework of property rules and liability rules involves two basic 
steps that yield four possible combinations of entitlement assignments and pro-
tective rules. These combinations are conventionally numbered in a particular or-
der as rules one through four. Over the years, numerous scholars have built upon 
Calabresi and Melamed’s four-rule structure with add-on rules that tweak the 
model’s second step of assigning property or liability rule protection. By contrast, 
academicians have devoted far less attention to what this Article calls “entitle-
ment-shifting rules”—rules that involve variations on the model’s first step of as-
signing the entitlement. Although government actors routinely shift entitlements 
in legitimate and useful ways, some types of entitlement shifting—especially cer-
tain laws and actions that shift core property entitlements—are difficult to defend 
on efficiency or equity grounds. This Article sets forth principles for identifying 
and analyzing entitlement-shifting rules, applies those principles to examine a di-
verse set of real-world examples ranging from civil asset forfeiture laws to pro-
posed drone regulations, and describes some basic strategies for deterring the 
most costly and unjust forms of entitlement shifting. By drawing attention to en-
titlement-shifting rules and their impacts, this Article paints Calabresi and Mela-
med’s model in a revealing new light and provides additional perspective on 
some of the core deficiencies of modern takings laws. 
INTRODUCTION 
Nearly half a century has transpired since Guido Calabresi and Douglas 
Melamed first introduced their “Cathedral model” of property rules and liabil-
ity rules in a 1972 issue of the Harvard Law Review.1 Applying the Cathedral 
model in its original form involves two basic steps: assigning a specific legal 
“entitlement” to one of two competing parties or groups, and then determining 
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 1 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabil-
ity: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
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whether to protect that entitlement with a “property rule” or a “liability rule.”2 
These steps yield four potential combinations of entitlement assignments and 
protective rules, which are numbered one through four in a particular order and 
are often displayed on a two-by-two diagram. Simple and revealing, Calabresi 
and Melamed’s framework has long been an important fixture in the law and 
economics literature. 
Over the years, scholars have identified numerous ways of expanding be-
yond the Cathedral model’s conventional four-rule structure with new rules 
that modify the model’s second basic step of assigning property or liability rule 
protection.3 Among the most notable of these are Abraham Bell and Gideon 
Parchomovsky’s “pliability rules”—dynamic add-on rules that involve various 
types of switching between property rule and liability rule protection across 
time.4 
In contrast, academicians have devoted far less attention to potential vari-
ations on the Cathedral model’s first step of assigning the entitlement. This 
Article seeks to help fill this gap by examining what it calls “entitlement-
shifting rules”: rules that initially assign an entitlement to one party and then 
subsequently reassign the same entitlement to another party. 
Government actors routinely shift entitlements in legitimate and useful 
ways, but certain types of entitlement shifting—especially certain laws and 
actions that shift core property entitlements—are difficult to defend on effi-
ciency or equity grounds. This Article sets forth a simple framework for ana-
lyzing entitlement-shifting rules and applies the framework to several real-
world examples, including intentional government flooding, civil asset forfei-
ture laws, and proposed drone regulations. The Article then highlights ways of 
reducing the most costly and unjust forms of entitlement shifting. By examin-
ing and evaluating several instances of entitlement-shifting rules and actions, 
this Article paints Calabresi and Melamed’s Cathedral model in yet another 
light and provides a new perspective on some of the primary deficiencies of 
modern takings laws. 
Part I of this Article defines entitlement shifting and distinguishes it from 
other common government actions involving legal entitlements.5 Part II prof-
fers a simple framework for analyzing entitlement-shifting rules and empha-
                                                                                                                           
 2 Id. at 1092. 
 3 See infra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 4 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002) 
(“Pliability . . . rules are contingent rules that provide an entitlement owner with property rule or lia-
bility rule protection as long as some specified condition obtains; however, once the relevant condi-
tion changes, a different rule protects the entitlement—either liability or property, as the circumstanc-
es dictate. Pliability rules, in other words, are dynamic rules . . . .”). 
 5 See infra notes 10–45 and accompanying text. 
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sizes the additional costs associated with laws that shift entitlements involving 
core property rights.6 Part III identifies and analyzes several specific examples 
of rules and actions that shift a single property entitlement at a time and em-
phasizes some simple means of mitigating the costs of such rules.7 Part IV then 
examines previous or proposed shifts of hundreds or even millions of property 
entitlements all at once, including those in the contexts of civil asset forfeiture 
laws, intentional government flooding of private land, and federal drone regu-
lation.8 Part IV highlights the potential for governments to shift large sets of 
property entitlements to benefit special interest groups and describes strategies 
for limiting such abuses.9 
I. WHAT ARE ENTITLEMENT-SHIFTING RULES? 
A basic tenet of microeconomics is that market economies can function 
efficiently over the long run only if the legal systems in which they operate 
allocate and sufficiently protect market actors’ core legal rights across time.10 
Legal theorists have likewise argued for centuries that justice requires that 
governments consistently protect and honor existing allocated rights, including 
property rights.11 Consistent with these principles, a host of common-law doc-
trines, statutory regimes, and constitutional provisions have long sought to 
safeguard countless types of legal entitlements. 
Governments occasionally deviate from these principles, however, assign-
ing valuable legal entitlements to certain parties only to then reassign them to 
entirely different parties.12 Such reassignments of entitlements are under-
emphasized within the law and economics literature, where analytic models 
often implicitly assume that governments cannot or will not reshuffle entitle-
ments after initially assigning them. To recognize the full implications of these 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See infra notes 46–126 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 127–210 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 211–294 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 211–294 and accompanying text. 
10 See JAMES R. KEARL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 494 (1993) (“If an economy is to allocate its 
resources efficiently, the government must define and protect property rights and contract rights 
. . . .”); Daniel H. Cole, Political Institutions, Judicial Review, and Private Property: A Comparative 
Institutional Analysis, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141, 152 (2007) (“[S]ecure property rights are an im-
portant component of the state’s institutional structure because they provide a necessary basis for 
capitalization and economic exchange . . . .”). 
11 One example of an equitable argument for respecting property rights is John Locke’s centuries-
old labor-desert theory. See Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 TEX. L. REV. 715, 742 
(2003) (describing Locke’s labor theory of property as “one of moral desert,” which provides that “the 
law grants a person a property right in a thing because that person deserves it as a reward for the virtue 
of having created the major part of its value” (citing MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING 
PROPERTY 105–06 (1993)) (other citations omitted)). 
 12 See infra notes 127–210 and accompanying text. 
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reassignments of entitlements, one must first grasp the basic features of enti-
tlement theory. Accordingly, Section A of this Part provides a general overview 
of entitlement theory.13 Section B then defines entitlement-shifting rules and 
describes how they fit within the Cathedral model.14 
A. Entitlement Theory: Coase, the Cathedral Model, and Beyond 
Much of modern entitlement theory is rooted in a pair of academic con-
cepts that have long been highly influential in law and economics circles.15 
The first is the Coase Theorem, which holds that, in the absence of transaction 
costs, legal entitlements associated with scarce resources will flow to their 
highest valued users, regardless of who is initially assigned such entitle-
ments.16 As Ronald Coase clearly recognized, few real-life situations are so 
devoid of transaction costs that the unconstrained private bargaining necessary 
to optimally allocate all relevant entitlements can readily occur.17 Still, Coase’s 
observations about how legal rules allocate entitlements and how transaction 
costs can impact allocative efficiency have long undergirded many aspects of 
contemporary law and economics.18 
A second classic entitlement theory construct that also furnishes much of 
the foundation for this Article is Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed’s 
famed “Cathedral model” of property rules and liability rules.19 The Cathedral 
model built meaningfully upon Coase’s work, proffering an accessible frame-
work for analyzing and comparing potential assignments of legal entitlements 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See infra notes 15–24 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 25–45 and accompanying text. 
15 For an insightful exploration of the nature of “entitlements” and their use within the law and 
economics literature, see Henry E. Smith, Complexity and the Cathedral: Making Law and Economics 
More Calabresian, 48 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 43, 54–56 (2019) (defining an “entitlement” as “any right to 
insist on a given conflict being resolved in one’s favor”). 
16 See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (arriving at 
this theory through a discussion of socially harmful business practices). Coase never actually states his 
namesake theorem in his landmark article and is said to have credited George Stigler with first using 
the term “Coase Theorem.” Stewart Schwab, Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen and Econo-
mists Do Not, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1171, 1173 (1989). 
17 See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 9 n.23 (“[T]he Coase theorem does not guar-
antee efficiency in positive transaction cost settings.”). 
18 See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract De-
fault Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 618 (1990) (referring to the Coase Theorem as an “enormously pow-
erful and influential insight”); Daniel S. Levy & David Friedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods? 
Reconsidering Property Rights and the Economic Allocation of Natural Resources, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 
493, 493 (1994) (calling the Coase Theorem “[o]ne of the most influential” theories in “law and eco-
nomics”); Clarisa Long, Proprietary Rights and Why Initial Allocations Matter, 49 EMORY L.J. 823, 
827 (2000) (“One of the most influential theories regarding initial rights or entitlements and their 
transfer is the Coase Theorem.”). 
19 See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1. 
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and means of enforcing those entitlements. Countless academic articles have 
referenced or applied the Cathedral model over the past half century, and the 
model continues to be among the most impactful analytic tools in legal aca-
demic literature.20 
Applying Calabresi and Melamed’s model to analyze a conflict over a 
particular entitlement generally involves two simple steps. The court or poli-
cymaker applying the model must first determine which of two or more com-
peting parties should hold the scarce entitlement at issue. Then, once it has 
clearly assigned the entitlement to a particular group or party, the court or poli-
cymaker must decide whether to protect the entitlement with a “property rule” 
or a “liability rule.”21 When an entitlement is protected by a property rule, oth-
er parties can acquire it from its holder only by purchasing it in a voluntary 
bargain.22 In contrast, when an entitlement is protected by a liability rule, one 
or more parties have a right to purchase the entitlement from its holder at a 
price approximating its objective value.23 These two steps of assigning the en-
titlement and then choosing a means of legally protecting it yield four possible 
rules, each conventionally labeled in a particular order and displayed on a two-
by-two diagram.24 
                                                                                                                           
20 Numerous academicians have noted the tremendous impact of the Cathedral model on law and 
economics research and scholarship over the years. See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 4 
(characterizing the Cathedral model as having produced a “vast literature” in its wake, and stating that 
the model “and in particular, the foundational distinction between property and liability rules, has 
been accepted by virtually all the commentators—supporters and critics alike”); George S. Geis, In-
ternal Poison Pills, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1169, 1197 (2009) (“Except for the ubiquitous Coase Theo-
rem, there may be no more famous law and economics framework than Guido Calabresi and Douglas 
Melamed’s ‘view of the cathedral.’” (footnote omitted)); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Essay, 
Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 440 
(1995) (describing the Cathedral model as “perhaps the most widely known and influential contribu-
tion” to the law and economics literature that builds upon Coase’s research). 
21 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1092. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. Calabresi and Melamed suggest in their article that the appropriate option price for unilat-
eral acquisition of the entitlement may be its value to its current holder. See id. (noting that the proper 
valuation “may be what it is thought the original holder of the entitlement would have sold it for”). 
24 This diagram is shown in Figure A below. See infra note 30 and accompanying text. Although 
Calabresi and Melamed did not include a two-by-two diagram in their article introducing the Cathe-
dral model, the diagram has since become a common way of displaying the model’s four original 
rules. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1116 (providing examples of the four rules); see 
also Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 29 (utilizing Calabresi and Melamend’s two-by-two dia-
gram); Richard R.W. Brooks, The Relative Burden of Determining Property Rules and Liability 
Rules: Broken Elevators in the Cathedral, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 267, 271–72 (2002) (same). 
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B. Entitlement-Shifting Rules Defined 
Over the years, numerous academicians have sought to add to Calabresi 
and Melamed’s simple Cathedral model framework by identifying new rules 
that go beyond the model’s original four.25 Professors Abraham Bell and Gide-
on Parchomovsky proposed some of the most influential possible additions to 
the model in their 2002 article, Pliability Rules.26 Bell and Parchomovsky’s 
work in particular underscored how certain laws and actions allow for dynamic 
switching between property rule and liability rule protection across time.27 
They defined “classic pliability rules” as rules that initially protect an entitle-
ment with a property rule but subsequently switch to liability rule protection.28 
Conversely, they used “loperty rules” to describe rules that start out by provid-
ing liability rule protection but subsequently switch to property rule protec-
tion.29 These two basic types of dynamic Cathedral model rules and a handful 
of others, which Bell and Parchomovsky referred to collectively as “pliability 
rules,” each involve movements across the vertical axis on the model’s con-
ventional two-by-two diagram, illustrated as a dashed vertical line on Figure A 
below.30 
                                                                                                                           
25 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of 
Liability Rules, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4–13 (2001) (describing possible “put-option” liability rules); 
Krier & Schwab, supra note 20, at 471 (describing a potential additive Cathedral model rule called the 
“double reverse twist”); Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Star-
tling Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2149, 2150, 2162 (1997) (identifying multiple, additional Cathedral model 
rules and giving them generic names such as “Rule 5CE”); see also Georg von Wangenheim & Fer-
nando Gomez, Conflicts of Entitlements in Property Law: The Complexity and Monotonicity of Rules, 
100 IOWA L. REV. 2389, 2392–93 (2015) (describing and highlighting the limitations of several of the 
add-on rules scholars have added to the Cathedral model in the decades following its introduction). 
26 See generally Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4. 
27 In their article, Bell and Parchomovsky repeatedly contrast the dynamic nature of pliability 
rules with the static nature of conventional property and liability rules. See id. at 5 (“Pliability rules 
. . . are dynamic rules, while property and liability rules are static.”); see also id. at 26 (“Calabresi and 
Melamed’s model is static; ours is dynamic.”). 
28 See id. at 31 (describing “classic pliability rules” as rules that “involve the transformation of an 
entitlement from property rule to liability rule protection”). 
29 See id. at 53 (defining “loperty rules” as rules that “begin with liability rule protection, which, 
upon the occurrence of a triggering event, is transformed into property rule protection”). 
30 Bell and Parchomovsky’s article also identified and labeled sub-categories of pliability rules, 
some of which appeared on a diagram in their article similar to the diagram in Figure A. Id. at 30. 
Although these additional rules are intentionally omitted from the Figure A diagram to better highlight 
the distinction between pliability rules and entitlement-shifting rules, as defined in this Article, most 
of them (e.g., zero order pliability, simultaneous pliability, and title shifting pliability rules) are men-
tioned elsewhere in this Article. See infra notes 37, 133, and 174–177 and accompanying text.  
NOTE: Because not all platforms support graphic material, Figure A is archived at: 
https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/62-4/Figure-A-
graphic-A1b.pdf [https://perma.cc/E43G-MM9U]. 
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Figure A: Basic Categories of Dynamic Cathedral Model Rules. 
 
Because they were focused primarily on ways to substitute between proper-
ty rules and liability rules, Bell and Parchomovsky understandably devoted less 
attention to what this Article calls “entitlement-shifting rules”: laws and gov-
ernment actions that cause movements across the dashed horizontal line on Fig-
ure A’s two-by-two diagram. Laws falling into this second major category of 
dynamic Cathedral model add-on rules, which initially assign an entitlement to 
one party but then reassign it later to a different party without any accompanying 
exchange of compensation, are less frequently acknowledged in the academic 
literature. Such limited attention could be partly due to a common implicit as-
sumption that, once a legal rule or government action has initially allocated an 
entitlement, reassigning that entitlement is not an acceptable or viable option.31 
                                                                                                                           
31 Even Calabresi and Melamed seemed to embrace the notion that, after a government has initial-
ly allocated an entitlement, that entitlement is not eligible for reassignment. See Calabresi & Mela-
med, supra note 1, at 1090 (“Having made its initial choice, society must enforce that choice.”); see 
also Yun-chien Chang, Optional Law in Property: Theoretical Critiques and a New View of the Ca-
thedral, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 459, 472 (2015) (observing that, in most instances, property “enti-
tlements are already assigned when the cases appear in court” so “[t]he court does not have much 
room to re-assign entitlements from the original owner to a new owner”). 
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Although Bell and Parchomovsky clearly recognized that certain types of 
legal rules, such as adverse possession laws, shift entitlements, they opted to 
label them as just another type of pliability rule.32 Such use of the word “plia-
bility” to describe rules that shift entitlements may be somewhat fitting in the 
sense that entitlement-shifting rules are flexible or “pliable” in nature. On the 
whole, however, categorizing entitlement-shifting rules as “pliability” rules 
arguably produces more confusion than clarity. The term “pliability” in the 
context of the Cathedral model is an obvious mishmash of the words “proper-
ty” and “liability,” in the same way that the word “loperty” blends “liability” 
and “property.” Even Bell and Parchomovsky’s own basic definition of pliabil-
ity rules described them as rules that toggle between property rule and liability 
rule protection.33 
In light of this, a more suitable nomenclature for dynamic Cathedral mod-
el rules is one that uses the umbrella term “pliability” to describe only those 
rules that involve switching between property and liability rule protection in 
either direction, as illustrated on Figure A above. Meanwhile, “entitlement-
shifting rules” is a more descriptively accurate term for laws and actions that 
involve uncompensated shifts in entitlements between stakeholders—
movements across the horizontal axis of the Cathedral model diagram as 
shown on Figure A. The balance of this Article employs this adjusted termino-
logical approach. 
1. Distinguishing Entitlement Transfers Under Liability Rules from 
Entitlement-Shifting Rules 
It is critical to note that, although legal entitlements change hands all of 
the time, only a small subset of those transfers involve entitlement-shifting 
rules. To be clear: entitlement shifting does not occur when parties voluntarily 
transfer an entitlement pursuant to an agreement or when a transfer is com-
pelled under a liability rule in exchange for monetary or in-kind compensa-
tion.34 Indeed, the compensation involved in those transactions is clear evi-
dence that no law or government action ever altered the entitlement’s initial 
                                                                                                                           
32 Bell and Parchomovsky specifically classified adverse possession laws as “title shifting pliabil-
ity rules,” which they defined as “combination[s] of property rules in which the triggering of a condi-
tion transfers property rule protection from the original entitlement holder to another.” Bell & Par-
chomovsky, supra note 4, at 6. 
33 See id. at 5 (defining pliability rules as “contingent rules that provide an entitlement owner with 
property rule or liability rule protection as long as some specified condition obtains; however, once 
the relevant condition changes, a different rule protects the entitlement—either liability or property, as 
the circumstances dictate”). 
34 The term “liability rule” appears to have originated with Calabresi and Melamed. See Calabresi 
& Melamed, supra note 1, at 1092 (“Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is 
willing to pay an objectively determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule.”). 
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assignment.35 Rules Two and Four of the Cathedral model, which protect ini-
tially assigned entitlements with liability rules, thus do not contemplate any 
entitlement shifting and are not entitlement-shifting rules. Although both of 
these rules allow for unilaterally compelled transfers of entitlements away 
from their initial entitlement holders, the compensation requirements embed-
ded into both rules honor how those entitlements were initially assigned. Ac-
cordingly, no entitlement shifting occurs when governments acquire private 
property for just compensation through an eminent domain proceeding or regu-
latory taking.36 Entitlement shifting likewise did or does not occur under the 
old mill acts,37 modern compulsory unitization statutes in oil and gas law,38 or 
any other laws allowing valuable entitlements to unilaterally shift to new par-
ties upon the payment of compensation to the initial entitlement holders.39 
On similar reasoning, no entitlement shifting happens when laws or gov-
ernment actions transfer away entitlements while simultaneously conferring 
adequate in-kind benefits upon losing parties.40 For example, when a city im-
                                                                                                                           
35 As Coase emphasized, such compensated transfers of entitlements are often essential to achiev-
ing allocative efficiency. See Coase, supra note 16, at 15 (“[I]f such market transactions are costless, 
such a rearrangement of rights will always take place if it would lead to an increase in the value of 
production.”). 
36 See Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost Analysis of 
Constitutional Remedies, 91 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1161 (2005) (“The Just Compensation Clause pro-
vides a liability rule as the exclusive form of protection against takings of property for public use, 
such as eminent domain.”). 
37 Most mill acts were nineteenth-century state legislative acts that generally allowed mill owners 
to flood some nearby land but required the owners to compensate neighbors for resulting damages, 
sometimes in excess of one hundred percent of the amount of the damages. Henry E. Smith, Property 
and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1736 (2004). Mill acts are often referred to by property 
and law and economics scholars as an example of a statutorily enacted liability rule. See, e.g., id. 
(“The mill acts, which used liability rules to overcome potential hold-out problems, are famous in the 
liability rule literature . . . .”). Bell and Parchomovsky categorized mill act statutes as examples of 
“simultaneous pliability rules” because they provided mere liability rule protection under certain nar-
row circumstances, but otherwise furnished property rule protection. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra 
note 4, at 52. 
38 See Troy A. Rule, Property Rights and Modern Energy, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 803, 833 
(2013) (“Compulsory unitization laws . . . effectively substitute liability rules for property rules as a 
way of overcoming holdout problems and other transaction costs while still promoting equity and 
fairness in fossil-fuel extraction.”). 
39 Iowa’s solar access statute, which allows landowners with rooftop solar panels to unilaterally 
acquire easement rights across neighboring airspace to protect the solar array from shading, is one 
other example of a statutorily enacted liability rule approach. See Troy A. Rule, Shadows on the Ca-
thedral: Solar Access Laws in a Different Light, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 851, 892 (“By requiring Neigh-
bors compensation, the Iowa statute acknowledges Neighbors’ entitlement to their airspace rights, 
classifying the statute as an application of Rule Four of the Cathedral Model.”). 
40 This concept is visible in the familiar regulatory takings law principle that government actions, 
which reshuffle entitlements but provide “average reciprocity of advantage” to all citizens involved, 
are less likely to trigger compensable takings. The phrase “average reciprocity of advantage” appeared 
in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous early regulatory takings law opinion in Pennsylvania Coal 
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poses a new forty-foot height restriction in a residential area, each landowner 
within the affected area loses entitlements to build structures in excess of forty 
feet but simultaneously receives valuable benefits in return because all others 
in the neighborhood are similarly prohibited from building in excess of that 
height.41 Receipt of such in-kind benefits may compensate losers of entitle-
ments enough that these rules more closely resemble applications of liability 
rules than of entitlement-shifting rules.42 
2. “Clarifying” Versus “Shifting” Entitlements 
Laws that merely clarify the scope or allocation of unassigned or unestab-
lished entitlements likewise involve no entitlement shifting. Statutes, regula-
tions, and judicial decisions that more precisely define fuzzy entitlements are 
sometimes needed when new technologies or shifts in social priorities cause 
new assets to emerge or cause certain resources to become significantly more 
valuable.43 For instance, new statutes were enacted and new caselaw devel-
oped in the mid-twentieth century to delineate property interests in atmospher-
ic moisture in response to technological advancements involving that re-
source.44 These laws merely clarified entitlements and did not shift them be-
cause the entitlements at issue had never previously been legally assigned. 
                                                                                                                           
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), and the U.S. Supreme Court implicitly incorporated it into 
its much-maligned ad hoc regulatory takings test in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104, 133, 136 (1978). Although the Penn Central test’s “average reciprocity of ad-
vantage” factor seems reasonable on its face, the line-drawing problems inherent in applying it have 
generated considerable criticism over the years. See, e.g., William W. Wade & Robert L. Bunting, 
Average Reciprocity of Advantage: “Magic Words” or Economic Reality—Lessons from Palazzolo, 
39 URB. LAW. 319, 319 (2007) (describing “average reciprocity of advantage” as “a phrase even more 
vexing to regulatory takings than the Penn Central test,” and arguing that the “Supreme Court and 
lower court decisions have obscured rather than clarified the concept”). 
41 See JAMES A. KUSHNER, SUBDIVISION LAW AND GROWTH MANAGEMENT § 3:7 (2d ed. 2019) 
(stating that those land use laws that are “[e]asiest to sustain” against regulatory takings claims are 
“planning and subdivision requirements presenting an ‘average reciprocity of advantage,’ whereby the 
property regulated is enhanced in value because of uniform restrictions, such as . . . height re-
strictions” (footnote omitted)). 
42 Concededly, certain instances involving partial compensation occupy gray areas between enti-
tlement-shifting rules and mere applications of liability rules that are not resolved through the distinc-
tions drawn in this Article. 
43 Property theorists often attribute this idea to Harold Demsetz, who famously observed that 
property rights in a resource tend to emerge to help “internalize externalities when the gains of inter-
nalization become larger than the cost of internalization.” Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Prop-
erty Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350 (1967). An externality arises when “the activity of one enti-
ty . . . directly affects the welfare of another in a way that is not transmitted by market prices.” HAR-
VEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 86 (5th ed. 1999). 
44 See Jianlin Chen, Optimal Property Rights for Emerging Natural Resources: A Case Study on 
Owning Atmospheric Moisture, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 47, 50–51 (2016) (describing how, after 
technological advancements first made it possible to harness atmospheric moisture, there were “nu-
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On the other hand, some laws and government actions that purport to 
merely clarify entitlements may really be aimed at shifting them from one 
group or party to another. Because of this risk, as highlighted in Part IV below, 
courts and policymakers should apply extra scrutiny to proposed statutes or 
legal doctrines that purport to clarify entitlements to ensure that such proposals 
are not actually disguised entitlement-shifting rules.45 
II. WHEN IS ENTITLEMENT SHIFTING JUSTIFIED? 
Government decisionmakers who encounter existing or proposed entitle-
ment-shifting rules can generally respond to them in one of three ways.46 The 
most straightforward approach is to simply allow the entitlement-shifting rule 
to persist or proceed as is. For instance, in a jurisdiction that allows successful 
adverse possessors to claim title without compensating original owners, this 
approach involves continued application of that rule. A second, opposite ap-
proach is to prohibit entitlement shifting and strictly protect the initial entitle-
ment holder’s entitlement with a property rule instead.47 In the context of ad-
verse possession, this approach requires all-out rejection of the adverse posses-
sion doctrine in favor of a rule that never allows squatters or encroachers to 
acquire title.48 A third, middle-ground approach is to convert the entitlement-
shifting rule to a liability or pliability rule by requiring the payment of com-
pensation for any unilateral transfers of the entitlement at issue.49 For adverse 
possession, this would involve allowing successful adverse possessors to take 
title but only after compensating original title holders for their losses. 
Of course, the difficulty lies in determining which of the three aforemen-
tioned approaches should apply to any given entitlement-shifting rule. Alt-
hough intuition rightly suggests that certain types of entitlement-shifting rules 
are far more defensible than others, some type of methodology is needed to 
help distinguish laudable ones from troubling ones. Sections A and B of this 
Part are an initial attempt to construct such a framework capable of accounting 
for the primary costs, benefits, and distributional impacts resulting from enti-
tlement-shifting rules.50 Section C then identifies some specific types of enti-
                                                                                                                           
merous legislative and regulatory responses (at both state and federal levels) and a handful of judicial 
decisions, some of which led to explicit legal pronouncements on the property rights to atmospheric 
moisture” (footnote omitted)). 
45 See infra notes 255–259 and accompanying text. 
 46 See infra notes 47–49 and accompanying text. 
47 To review how a “property rule” operates, see supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
48 The adverse possession doctrine is described and analyzed in detail below in Part III.A. See in-
fra notes 138–148 and accompanying text. 
49 For a general description of pliability rules, see supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
 50 See infra notes 53–98 and accompanying text. 
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tlement-shifting rules that seem to enjoy broad acceptance,51 and Section D 
draws a distinction between “entitlements” and “property entitlements.”52 
A. Weighing Costs and Benefits 
Entitlement-shifting rules can generate multiple types of costs and bene-
fits, not all of which are obvious to the casual observer.53 Fortunately, Profes-
sor Frank Michelman’s fifty-year-old cost-benefit structure for evaluating 
whether a confiscatory government action should trigger a compensable taking 
provides a useful starting point for designing an analytic framework for enti-
tlement-shifting rules.54 The three primary measures that comprise Michel-
man’s structure each also impact whether an entitlement-shifting rule or action 
is cost-justified. 
 Michelman’s framework first asks whether a proposed transfer of rights 
would generate positive “efficiency gains,” meaning that the recipient places a 
greater value on the rights than the party losing them.55 If a proposed transfer 
of rights satisfies this test, Michelman’s structure then calls for a weighing of 
two other measures—“settlement costs” and “demoralization costs”—to in-
form the separate question of whether the payment of just compensation is 
warranted in connection with the transfer.56 The following are brief descrip-
                                                                                                                           
 51 See infra notes 99–106 and accompanying text. 
 52 See infra notes 107–126 and accompanying text. 
 53 See infra notes 58–79 and accompanying text. 
54 See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214–18 (1967). 
55 Id. at 1214. Although Michelman never used the more modern microeconomics term “alloca-
tive efficiency” in his article to describe what he called the “efficiency gains” from a potential trans-
fer, his descriptions of these gains suggest that he was generally referring to allocative efficiency. See 
id. (defining “efficiency gains” as “the excess of benefits produced by a measure over losses inflicted 
by it, where benefits are measured by the total number of dollars which prospective gainers would be 
willing to pay to secure adoption, and losses are measured by the total number of dollars which pro-
spective losers would insist on as the price of agreeing to adoption”); see also id. at 1214–15 (“A 
measure attended by positive efficiency gains is, under utilitarian ethics, prima facie desirable.”). 
56 Id. at 1214. Michelman argued that requiring compensation is cost-justified only when demor-
alization costs exceed settlement costs. See id. at 1215 (“The correct utilitarian statement . . . insofar 
as the issue of compensability is concerned, is that compensation is due whenever demoralization 
costs exceed settlement costs, and not otherwise.”). In addition to Michelman, other commentators 
have likewise suggested that courts should “uncouple” efficiency and justice considerations in the 
takings context, and consider the question of whether a taking has occurred separately from consider-
ing whether to order the payment of just compensation. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, 
Commentary, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 997 (1999) 
(advocating that courts “uncouple efficiency considerations from justice considerations, or, put anoth-
er way . . . uncouple ‘taking’ on the one hand from ‘compensation’ on the other”). Michael Heller and 
James Krier suggest that this approach would make it possible to order governments to pay compensa-
tion into a general fund rather than to specific individuals or to order non-government stakeholders to 
pay compensation. See id. at 1000. 
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tions of each of Michelman’s three cost and benefit measures and their rele-
vance when analyzing entitlement-shifting rules.57 
1. Allocative Efficiency Impacts 
The most visible costs and benefits associated with entitlement-shifting 
rules are those accruing directly to the parties that gain or lose the shifted enti-
tlement.58 Although Michelman generically labeled the net sum of these costs 
and benefits as “efficiency gains,” he seemed to be measuring whether the en-
titlement transfer at issue was an allocatively efficient or “Kaldor-Hicks supe-
rior” move for the parties directly involved.59 A transfer passes this narrowly 
focused test if the welfare gains accruing directly to the receiver of the entitle-
ment exceed the losses suffered by the party losing it.60 
Entitlement-shifting rules involve no compensation to losers,61 so apply-
ing such rules with positive-value entitlements always imposes welfare losses 
on losing parties and thus never constitutes a “Pareto superior” move—a move 
that makes at least one party better off without making any party worse off.62 
Some shifts of entitlements, however, are not even Kaldor-Hicks superior. Be-
cause entitlement-shifting rules involve no compensation to losers, govern-
ments rarely internalize all of the costs of entitlement-shifting actions and may 
thus rationally opt to shift entitlements even in some instances in which doing 
                                                                                                                           
 57 See infra notes 58–79 and accompanying text. 
 58 See infra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
59 See Michelman, supra note 54, at 1214 (defining “efficiency gains” as “the excess of benefits 
produced by a measure over losses inflicted by it”). The origins of the term “Kaldor-Hicks” efficiency 
date back more than eighty years. See generally J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 
49 ECON. J. 696 (1939); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal 
Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939). 
60 See Bruce Chapman, The Rational and the Reasonable: Social Choice Theory and Adjudica-
tion, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 114 (1994) (“Kaldor-Hicks efficiency . . . is what wealth-maximizing 
lawyer/economists appeal to when they recommend the allocation of a legal entitlement to that party 
who is willing to pay the most to receive it, or the party who could compensate all the losers for the 
loss of an entitlement and still be better off herself.”). 
61 See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
62 See Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 
513 (1980) (“An allocation of resources is Pareto superior to an alternative allocation if and only if no 
one is made worse off by the distribution and the welfare of at least one person is improved.”); see 
also JOSEPH E. STIGLETZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 65 (4th ed. 2015) (referring to changes 
that make at least one party better off without making any party worse off as “Pareto improvements”). 
Of course, voluntary sales of entitlements and compensated transfers of entitlements pursuant to liabil-
ity rules can be Pareto improvements. Bruce Chapman has alluded to this idea. See Chapman, supra 
note 60, at 114 (“[S]ince actual compensation need not be paid, Kaldor-Hicks-efficient reallocations 
of goods or entitlements are only potentially Pareto efficient; in actual fact, such allocations do pro-
duce losers.”). 
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so reduces allocative efficiency.63 Indeed, deterring inefficient confiscatory 
actions by compelling governments to internalize the costs of them has long 
been a chief economic argument in favor of the just compensation requirement 
under takings laws.64 The absence of compensation under entitlement-shifting 
rules makes asking whether shifts under the proposed rule would increase al-
locative efficiency a critical first step in analyzing these rules. If shifts under 
the rule are likely to decrease allocative efficiency, the rule is not economically 
justifiable and cost-benefit analysis of the rule stops there.65 
2. Demoralization Costs 
If a government-facilitated transfer of rights is likely to increase alloca-
tive efficiency between the immediate parties, Michelman’s cost-benefit analy-
sis then proceeds to a separate question of whether to require compensation in 
connection with it.66 According to Michelman, requiring compensation is cost-
justifiable whenever the demoralization costs from not requiring compensation 
would exceed the settlement costs from requiring compensation.67 
Michelman defined “demoralization costs” as: 
[T]he total of (1) the dollar value necessary to offset disutilities 
which accrue to losers and their sympathizers specifically from the 
realization that no compensation is offered [in exchange for forfeit-
ed entitlements], and (2) the present capitalized dollar value of lost 
future production (reflecting either impaired incentives or social un-
rest) caused by demoralization of uncompensated losers, their sym-
pathizers, and other observers disturbed by the thought that they 
                                                                                                                           
63 See, e.g., Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment 
Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 30, 88 (2003) (referring to the “cost-internalization argument” as “a (if not the) major justifi-
cation for requiring governments to compensate those whose property is rendered either unavailable 
or less valuable as a result of government action”). 
64 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.7, at 58 (4th ed. 1992) 
(“The simplest economic explanation for the requirement of just compensation is that it prevents the 
government from overusing the taking power.”); Heller & Krier, supra note 56, at 999 (“If the gov-
ernment were free to take resources without paying for them, it would not feel incentives, created by 
the price system, to use those resources efficiently.”); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Regula-
tory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 749, 758 (1994) (“[I]f com-
pensation is zero, the regulator perceives the regulation as being costless and will overregulate.”). 
Michael Heller and James Krier characterized this same basic impact as a beneficial “deterrence” 
effect of the compensation requirement. Heller & Krier, supra note 56, at 999. 
 65 See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
 66 Michelman, supra note 54, at 1215. 
67 Id. 
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themselves may be subjected to similar treatment on some other oc-
casion.68 
In the context of entitlement-shifting rules, demoralization costs are costs re-
sulting from recognition by entitlement losers and all other observers that the 
government has shifted entitlements unilaterally and may do so again in the 
future. 
Although the demoralization costs of entitlement-shifting rules can vary 
dramatically, a few general factors tend to influence the magnitude of these 
costs in any given case. For instance, demoralization costs are likely to be 
greater when the entitlements involved are core property interests or other in-
terests that have long been viewed as sacrosanct and dependably protected un-
der the law.69 Multiple takings law principles seem implicitly aimed at limiting 
these types of demoralization costs. For instance, the famous rule in Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., which strongly protects landowners’ 
rights to exclude on private land by making permanent physical occupations of 
land per se regulatory takings, arguably fits this description.70 The Penn Cen-
tral Transportation Co. v. New York City test’s consideration of reasonable “in-
vestment-backed expectations” likewise helps to limit demoralization costs by 
providing some assurance that when a citizen has made significant recent in-
vestments in property based on existing law, courts will at least consider that 
reliance in their takings analysis.71 
Demoralization costs are also likely to be greater when it is evident that 
influence from special interests has prompted a government entity to shift cer-
tain entitlements in favor of such interests and that the entity could easily do so 
again.72 Some existing takings law principles likewise seem aimed at reducing 
demoralization costs borne from these types of concerns. For example, as Jus-
tice O’Connor implied in her dissenting opinion in the notorious Kelo v. City of 
New London case, one supposed benefit of the Takings Clause’s “public use” 
                                                                                                                           
68 Id. at 1214 (footnote omitted). 
69 Some courts have highlighted the potential collateral consequences of allowing governments to 
freely take or destroy property interests without compensation. See, e.g., Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 95 
So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 1957) (“[W]e hope we never become insensitive to the clear and indefeasible proper-
ty rights of the people guaranteed by our state and federal organic law, nor forgetful of the principle of 
universal law that the right to own property is an indispensable attribute of any so-called ‘free gov-
ernment’ and that all other rights become worthless if the government possesses an untrammeled 
power over the property of its citizens.”). 
70 458 U.S. 419, 432–35 (1982). 
71 See 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (“The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, 
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions are . . . relevant considerations.”). 
72 Such circumstances also raise objective procedural injustice concerns, as described below. See 
infra notes 95–98 and accompanying text. 
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requirement is that it limits governments’ powers to shift property entitlements 
solely to cater to special interests—a constraint that, when functioning effec-
tively, helps to reduce that type of demoralization cost.73 
3. Avoided Settlement Costs 
“Settlement costs” are a third and final measure from Michelman’s tak-
ings compensation analysis framework that is also relevant when evaluating 
some types of entitlement-shifting rules.74 Michelman defined settlement costs 
as “the dollar value of the time, effort, and resources which would be required 
in order to reach compensation settlements adequate to avoid demoralization 
costs.”75 In short, settlement costs are costs associated with the measuring and 
paying of future compensation claims that result solely because of the prece-
dent established by requiring compensation in the instant case. 
The actual settlement costs incurred under applications of entitlement-
shifting rules are always zero because, by definition, shifts occur only when no 
compensation is paid.76 Laws and actions that shift core property-related enti-
tlements, however, typically occur in the shadow of alternative rules or actions 
that could have instead required government compensation to entitlement los-
ers.77 In that sense, avoided settlement costs are implicit in any decision to ap-
ply an entitlement-shifting rule. 
Like demoralization costs, avoided settlement costs under entitlement-
shifting rules can vary widely. As a general principle, however, the size and 
quantity of similar future compensation claims that would arise if compensa-
tion were paid in the given instance tend to most greatly influence the magni-
tude of these costs. If requiring compensation in a particular instance is likely 
to lead to many large future compensation claims, the settlement costs avoided 
through use of an entitlement-shifting rule are much greater. For instance, a 
rule that sets an important precedent by requiring compensation to landowners 
                                                                                                                           
73 See 545 U.S. 469, 503 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The specter of condemnation hangs 
over all property. Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any 
home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.”). 
 74 Michelman, supra note 54, at 1214. 
75 Id. Michelman elaborated that settlement costs of a particular government action cover: 
(a) the costs of bargaining to out-of-court settlements of . . . claims occasioned by [the] 
measure which seem indistinguishable from the claim recognized; (b) the added (mar-
ginal) cost of operating the judicial system to settle those of the indistinguishable 
claims not settled by agreement; and (c) the costs of disposition, whether by agreement 
or by judgment, of all claims arising out of other measures, which claims would never 
have been urged had not the claim in question been recognized . . . . 
Id. at 1214 n.99. 
76 See supra notes 25–37 and accompanying text. 
 77 See infra notes 254–294 and accompanying text. 
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for government-caused flooding on their land could implicate very large set-
tlement costs if numerous similar cases are likely to arise in the coming 
years.78 Conversely, an entitlement-shifting approach that instead required no 
compensation in such situations would avoid those high settlement costs but 
generate high demoralization costs.79 
B. Justice Considerations 
In addition to generating costs and benefits, entitlement-shifting rules also 
can impact justice in ways that warrant consideration when evaluating these 
rules.80 Justice-based arguments have long served alongside efficiency ones as 
primary rationales for the just compensation requirement in takings law, and 
such arguments can have comparable relevance when evaluating entitlement-
shifting laws and actions.81 There is unfortunately no widely accepted method 
for measuring a given entitlement-shifting rule’s justice impacts or for weigh-
ing those effects against economic impacts. Still, it is worthwhile to highlight 
at least three types of justice that are implicated by some entitlement-shifting 
rules: distributive justice, corrective justice, and procedural justice.82 
Because entitlement-shifting rules often indirectly redistribute wealth, 
they can potentially have considerable impacts on distributive justice. Distribu-
tional justice is typically defined as the fair or equitable distribution of assets 
and burdens among all members of society.83 In their landmark article, Cala-
bresi and Melamed specifically included “distributional preferences” alongside 
                                                                                                                           
78 A discussion of a government entity’s attempt to shift entitlements in the context of intentional 
flooding of land follows in Part IV below. See infra notes 238–252 and accompanying text. 
 79 See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
 80 See infra notes 81–98 and accompanying text. 
81 Michelman is generally credited with introducing the basic efficiency and justice framework 
that commonly serves as a starting point for analyses of the Takings Clause’s just compensation re-
quirement. See, e.g., Vicki Been, Does an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine Make Sense?, 
11 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 49, 49–50 (2002) (discussing Michelman’s “fairness” justification “for com-
pensating those whose property diminishes in value as the result of regulatory actions”); Heller & 
Krier, supra note 56, at 998 (“[T]here appears to be virtual consensus that the purposes of just com-
pensation are . . . [what] Frank Michelman calls . . . ‘utility’ and ‘fairness’ in an article that remains 
. . . the most significant piece of academic commentary on our subject.” (citing Michelman, supra 
note 54, at 1165)). 
82 Robert Kuehn helped to popularize analyses under these three types of justice and social justice 
within the environmental justice literature. See Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Jus-
tice, 30 ENV’T L. REP. 10,681, 10,681 (2000) (highlighting distributive justice, procedural justice, 
corrective justice, and social justice as the four predominant types of justice within the environmental 
justice movement). 
83 See, e.g., Kyle D. Logue, Reparations as Redistribution, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1319, 1342 (2004) 
(defining distributive justice generally as “the idea that scarce societal benefits and burdens ought to 
be distributed fairly across the members of society”). 
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efficiency concerns as a relevant factor when initially assigning entitlements.84 
Their point seemed to be that, all else equal, initially assigning an entitlement 
to the party with less wealth promotes distributive justice.85 In a similar vein, 
some scholars have argued that adjusting legal rules—which often shifts enti-
tlements—is sometimes a justifiable means of advancing distributive justice 
goals.86 
Occasionally, advocates have championed certain types of entitlement-
shifting rules primarily because of their potential distributional justice effects. 
Although many economists have argued that wealth redistribution objectives 
are better pursued through a progressive income tax system than through the 
rules of private law,87 others have supported shifting entitlements instead—
especially when initial allocations of entitlements have stacked the deck 
against certain disadvantaged groups.88 
Of course, distributive justice arguments can sometimes cut the other di-
rection and weigh against a proposed entitlement-shifting rule if the rule is 
likely to regressively or unfairly redistribute wealth. For instance, distributive 
justice concerns might arise if a proposed law or government action appears 
                                                                                                                           
84 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1093 (citing “economic efficiency, distributional 
preferences, and other justice considerations” as the primary considerations when assigning entitle-
ments). 
 85 See generally id. at 1098–1101 (discussing the “distributional goals” of assigning entitlements). 
86 See Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and Econom-
ics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1056 (2016) (challenging the common presumption that tax-and-transfer 
approaches to wealth redistribution are always superior to approaches that involve adjustments to 
legal rules); Zachary Liscow, Note, Reducing Inequality on the Cheap: When Legal Rule Design 
Should Incorporate Equity as Well as Efficiency, 123 YALE L.J. 2478, 2478 (2014) (“This Note de-
velops a framework for understanding when policymakers should use equity-informed legal rules—
rather than taxes—to redistribute.”). 
87 Professors Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have been the most influential in popularizing ar-
guments that the income tax system is often better suited than the legal system for redistributing 
wealth. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the 
Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821, 821 (2000) 
(“[W]e revisit our argument and others that favor relying on the income tax system to redistribute 
income . . . .”); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the 
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667 (1994) (“[R]edistribution through 
legal rules offers no advantage over redistribution through the income tax system and typically is less 
efficient.”). Other scholars have since emphasized the relatively wide acceptance of this concept in 
law and economics circles. See, e.g., Fennell & McAdams, supra note 86, at 1059 n.22 (“[M]ost law 
and economics scholars envision combining [wealth maximizing policies] with redistribution through 
the tax-and-transfer system to pursue the ultimate maximand of welfare.”). 
88 See, e.g., David Blankfein-Tabachnick & Kevin A. Kordana, Kaplow and Shavell and the Pri-
ority of Income Taxation and Transfer, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 8 (2017). Blankfein-Tabachnick and 
Kordana assert that “Kaplow and Shavell’s conclusion that income taxation and transfer is most effi-
cient has failed to properly take into account . . . underlying property rules, and . . . should be reject-
ed.” Id. They aver that “maximal efficiency in meeting equity-oriented distributive aims will, at times, 
demand that such aims be met via non-tax and transfer legal rules, such as those of property and basic 
entitlement.” Id. 
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likely to shift entitlements from disadvantaged groups to privileged and politi-
cally powerful ones or to single out and place inordinate burdens on a small 
number of politically weak parties.89 Such concerns are detectable in the copy-
right extension, subsurface pore space, and drone regulation examples in Part 
IV below.90 
Certain other types of entitlement-shifting rules can potentially violate 
corrective justice ideals. The term “corrective justice” typically stands for the 
notion that defendants who act wrongfully or violate plaintiffs’ rights should 
be required to fully compensate them for all resulting harms.91 An important 
corollary to this principle, however, is that defendants should not be dispropor-
tionately punished.92 Laws that go too far in shifting entitlements away from 
wrongdoers as a way of punishing their unlawful behavior can arguably con-
travene corrective justice principles in this latter sense.93 The civil asset forfei-
ture laws analyzed in Part III below are one example of a category of laws that 
potentially raises this type of corrective justice concern.94 
Some types of entitlement-shifting rules may even operate in ways that 
threaten procedural justice. Although procedural justice has been subject to 
multiple definitions and sub-definitions, a version that one pair of writers call 
“objective procedural justice” seems to best describe the type of procedural 
justice at issue in the context of entitlement-shifting rules.95 Allan Lind and Tom 
Tyler defined objective procedural justice as “the capacity of a procedure . . . to 
make either the decisions themselves or the decision-making process more fair 
by, for example, reducing some clearly unacceptable bias or prejudice.”96 
                                                                                                                           
89 For a detailed examination of this “singling out” concept, which is visibly emphasized in mod-
ern regulatory takings jurisprudence, see Michael Pappas, Singled Out, 76 MD. L. REV. 122 (2016). 
90 See infra notes 260–294 and accompanying text. 
91 See Kenneth W. Simons, Corrective Justice and Liability for Risk-Creation: A Comment, 38 
UCLA L. REV. 113, 125–26 (1990) (“Corrective justice most commonly is defined as the defendant’s 
obligation to compensate for harm that she has caused wrongfully or in violation of the plaintiff’s 
rights.”). 
92 See Thomas T. Uhl, Bystander Emotional Distress: Missing an Opportunity to Strengthen the 
Ties That Bind, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1399, 1448 (1995) (noting that “[c]orrective justice suggests a 
limit on liability because it insists upon fairness for both plaintiff and defendant” and thus precludes 
laws from “impos[ing] disproportionate liability” on defendants). 
93 In particular, this argument might arise in situations in which those charged with crimes are 
forced to forfeit privately held assets having economic value that far exceeds the magnitude of harms 
caused by their unlawful acts. See Kevin Cole, Essay, Civilizing Civil Forfeiture, 7 J. CONTEMP. LE-
GAL ISSUES 249, 257 (1996) (“[S]ome theories of corrective justice limit civil obligations to the repair 
of actual harm.”). 
94 See infra notes 152–175 and accompanying text. 
95 E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 3 
(1988). 
96 Id. 
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An entitlement-shifting rule arguably violates objective procedural justice 
ideals when it appears that special interests have undermined the impartiality 
of the political process and persuaded government actors to shift entitlements 
in their favor. A commonly cited benefit of the Takings Clause’s just compensa-
tion requirement is that it helps to deter abuses of government power that trans-
fer entitlements to politically powerful groups.97 As highlighted in Part IV be-
low, because entitlement-shifting rules inherently involve no payment of just 
compensation under the Takings Clause, they can be powerful political rent-
seeking tools in ways that contravene this important species of procedural jus-
tice.98 
C. Innocuous Types of Entitlement Shifting 
Although entitlement-shifting rules and actions inherently involve some 
costs and can threaten justice ideals, many types of entitlement shifting are 
clearly cost-justifiable and are widely accepted.99 Indeed, if the term “entitle-
ment” is construed broadly to encompass a wide and inclusive range of legal 
rights and privileges, entitlement-shifting rules are visible throughout Western 
democratic systems.100 Legislative, regulatory, and even judicial actions rou-
tinely shift legal entitlements among citizens and governments in various ways 
over time without imposing substantial new social costs. 
Legislative actions regularly shift generic legal entitlements in an effort to 
better reflect the ever-changing collective will of the citizenry. For example, a 
statute enacted in Indiana in 2019 expressly allows individuals in the state to 
carry guns into churches, including churches that have schools or day care fa-
                                                                                                                           
 97 See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59 STAN. L. 
REV. 871, 872 (2007) (“‘[J]ust compensation’ remains the only meaningful safeguard of private prop-
erty rights and the only check on government abuse of its eminent domain power.”); Daryl J. Levin-
son, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311, 1384 (2002) (stating that the 
just compensation requirement “discourag[es] interest-group rent-seeking . . . by preventing govern-
ment[s] from continuously readjusting property entitlements” (citing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MAR-
KETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 207–11 (1997)) (other citation omitted)). 
98 See infra notes 211–294 and accompanying text. For an explanation of rent-seeking, see infra 
note 255 and accompanying text. Examples of attempts to use entitlement-seeking rules as rent-
seeking tools also appear in Part III below. See infra notes 255–259 and accompanying text. 
 99 See infra notes 100–106 and accompanying text. 
100 Multiple scholars have applied this type of broad interpretation of “entitlement.” See, e.g., An-
drew Blair-Stanek, Crises and Tax, 67 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1165 (2018) (suggesting that property rules 
and liability rules within tax law “protect the government’s entitlement to taxpayer compliance with 
numerous requirements”); Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of 
Mass Detentions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 755, 763 (2004) (arguing that “[a]lmost all individual constitu-
tional rights are negative entitlements” within the Cathedral model framework and that “[m]ost enti-
tlements held by the government are positive, such as the right to regulate commerce, to tax, or to call 
out the militia”). 
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cilities on the premises.101 Prior to the law’s enactment, church owners effec-
tively held an entitlement to keep guns out of their buildings: it was a felony to 
carry a handgun onto a church property without permission if there was also a 
school or day care onsite.102 The 2019 statute shifted that entitlement from the 
state and church owners to any church visitor in Indiana interested in toting a 
gun. Comparable entitlement shifting occurs throughout the country every year 
as newly enacted statutes go into effect. 
Courts likewise take legitimate actions that shift valuable legal entitle-
ments from time to time. The doctrine of stare decisis constrains the ability of 
courts to shift legal entitlements by limiting their authority to reach holdings 
that contradict established prior precedents.103 Nevertheless, courts still occa-
sionally overturn existing precedent in ways that effectively shift entitle-
ments.104 The fact that courts have some leeway to deviate from prior prece-
dent is generally accepted as a positive virtue of the judicial system that en-
hances the capacity of caselaw to evolve and adapt to circumstantial changes 
over time.105 Constitutional constraints on the ability of courts to reverse exist-
                                                                                                                           
101 H.B. 1284, 121st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2019). 
 102 See IND. CODE § 35-47-9-2 (2017) (making it a felony to possess a firearm on school proper-
ty); see also IND. CODE § 35-31.5-2-285 (2018) (defining “school property” to include “grounds adja-
cent to and owned or rented in common with a building or other structure” that constitutes a school 
property). News reports at the time the bill was enacted emphasized the changed law. See, e.g., Brett 
Kast, Churches Look to Set Up Security Teams After Indiana Law Changes to Allow Guns in Church, 
YOUR NEWS NOW (Dec. 31, 2019), https://cbs4indy.com/news/churches-look-to-set-up-security-teams-
after-indiana-law-changes-to-allow-guns-in-church/ [https://perma.cc/8BVM-6MFG]. 
103 See Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining stare decisis as “[t]he 
doctrine of precedent, under which a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points 
arise again in litigation”). On multiple occasions, the Supreme Court has affirmed the importance of 
the doctrine. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 842 (1991) (“[O]verruling a precedent of 
this Court is a matter of no small import . . . .”); Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 
483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987) (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of 
law.”). 
104 For example, in its 2019 holding in Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019), the 
Supreme Court, overturning its own forty-year-old precedent, arguably shifted to private claimants 
certain valuable entitlements related to commencing a lawsuit against one state in the court of a differ-
ent state. See Anita Krishnakumar, Academic Highlight: Hyatt Is Latest Example of Textualist-
Originalist Justices’ Willingness to Overturn Precedent, SCOTUSBLOG (May 24, 2019), https://www.
scotusblog.com/2019/05/academic-highlight-hyatt-is-latest-example-of-textualist-originalist-justices-
willingness-to-overturn-precedent/ [https://perma.cc/BU5Z-P9FR] (“The U.S. Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in [Hyatt] has received significant attention for its overruling of Nevada v. Hall, a 40-year-old 
precedent that held that states lack sovereign immunity in each other’s courts.”); see also Ashlea 
Ebeling, Supreme Court Shows It’s Ready to Overrule Precedent, Dissent Sounds Alarm in California 
v. Hyatt, FORBES (May 13, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2019/05/13/supreme-
court-shows-its-ready-to-overrule-precedent-dissent-sounds-alarm-in-california-v-hyatt/?sh=d5f0c4
ccbaba [https://perma.cc/HYA5-HLRH]. 
105 See Rebecca Haw, Delay and Its Benefits for Judicial Rulemaking Under Scientific Uncertain-
ty, 55 B.C. L. REV. 331, 355 (2014) (“[A] significant change in circumstance that renders a rule obvi-
ously wrong or inefficient can justify its revision.”). The Supreme Court itself has emphasized the 
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ing precedent and the general rarity of major reversals help to minimize the 
demoralization costs associated with this judicial practice. So long as courts do 
not overturn established precedents too frequently, abruptly, or dramatically, 
the modest additional legal uncertainty generated from allowing such entitle-
ment shifting seldom causes substantial harm.106 
D. “Entitlements” Versus “Property Entitlements” 
On the other hand, some types of entitlement-shifting rules are rarely effi-
cient or just.107 In particular, laws and government actions that shift core prop-
erty-related entitlements have a greater tendency to generate high demoraliza-
tion costs and to contravene widely held justice ideals. In many cases, adding 
compensation requirements to convert these rules into liability rules or pliabil-
ity rules could potentially make them more just and more efficient. 
For simplicity, this Article uses “property entitlement” as a shorthand 
term to describe any entitlement that authorizes its holder to exclude all others 
from a particular asset. Based on this definition, governments shift property 
entitlements whenever they authorize themselves or third parties to intrude 
upon or otherwise make possessory use of private property without permission 
or compensation. Assuming that the initial entitlement holder is the “plaintiff,” 
most entitlement-shifting rules involving property entitlements result in 
movements across the dashed horizontal axis from Rule One to Rule Three in 
Figure A above.108 Because the term “property entitlement” appears extensive-
ly throughout the analysis that follows, a bit more explanation for its narrow 
definition in this Article is warranted here. 
Recognizing property’s unique role in fostering economic stability, gov-
ernments have long sought to vigorously protect property, even as they have 
struggled to define it. Early influential figures, such as John Locke, often em-
phasized that citizens’ property rights, together with life and liberty, deserved 
                                                                                                                           
significant value of having the flexibility to overturn old precedent occasionally in response to chang-
es over time. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (stating that “stare 
decisis is not an ‘inexorable command,’” and declaring that, “when this Court reexamines a prior 
holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations,” 
including “whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old 
rule of significant application or justification” (citation omitted)), aff’g in part, rev’g in part 947 F.2d 
682 (3d Cir. 1991). 
106 Courts are generally obligated to consider such potential harms when deciding whether to 
overturn existing precedent. See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 854 (noting that courts generally 
consider, among other things, “whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a spe-
cial hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation” (citing 
United States v. Title Ins. & Tr. Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924))). 
 107 See supra notes 89–98 and accompanying text. 
108 See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. Of course, if the initial entitlement holder is 
the defendant, most entitlement-shifting rules instead move from Rule Three to Rule One. 
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heightened governmental protection.109 Accordingly, strong safeguards for 
property rights appear in the Due Process110 and Takings Clauses of the U.S. 
Constitution.111 Nonetheless, legislatures, courts, and legal scholars have never 
fully coalesced around a single conception of property.112 First-year law stu-
dents typically encounter at least two competing definitions of property: the 
Blackstonian view of property as a right to exclude and the more flexible char-
acterization of property as a bundle of sticks or rights.113 Meanwhile, courts 
have seemingly constructed their own diverse set of rules about what may con-
stitute a cognizable property right in various legal contexts, often applying dif-
ferent interpretations of the term depending on whether they are considering a 
takings claim, a due process claim, or a claim under common property law.114 
“Property” is often broadly described as authority to engage in certain ac-
tions related to a specific asset,115 with corresponding duties in others to ob-
serve and respect that authority.116 Over the years, property scholars have la-
                                                                                                                           
109 John Locke regarded life, liberty, and property as fundamental natural rights. JOHN LOCKE, 
THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, reprinted in THE SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN 
LOCKE (Paul E Sigmund ed., Norton 2005) (1689). Thomas Jefferson ultimately substituted “the pur-
suit of happiness” for “property” when drafting the Declaration of Independence. THE DECLARATION 
OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also Jeffrey C. Sindelar, Jr., Of Form and Function: 
Lockean Political Philosophy and Mass Tort, 90 NEB. L. REV. 887, 904 (2012) (discussing John 
Locke’s “tremendous influence on the political philosophy of America’s Founding Fathers”). 
110 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (providing that no citizen shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law”). 
111 Id. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion.”). 
112 Other observers have highlighted the great variety of academic perspectives concerning the 
nature of property. See, e.g., J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. 
REV. 711, 800–01 (1996) (“Property has been variously regarded as all distributable resources, as 
alienable entitlements, as an incentive to invest, as a source of personhood, as economic power, as 
status, as a share in society’s wealth, as a reward for effort and talent, as an incentive to labor, as a 
ground for inculcating responsibility, as an expression of the free will, and I am sure, others as well.”). 
113 See, e.g., THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
16–17 (3d ed. 2017) (contrasting William Blackstone’s essentialist view of property as the right to 
exclude, with the conception of property as a “bundle of sticks”). 
114 Professor Thomas Merrill has suggested that courts seem to implicitly embrace a series of 
“patterning definitions” for property in constitutional law cases, employing one of three different 
applications depending on the type of legal claim at issue. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of 
Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 954–59 (2000) (“[I]t is desirable to have three separate 
patterning definitions of constitutional property, one each for procedural due process, takings law, and 
substantive due process.”). 
115 See Edella Schlager & Elinor Ostrom, Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A 
Conceptual Analysis, 68 LAND ECON. 249, 250 (1992) (defining a “property right” as “the authority to 
undertake particular actions related to a specific domain” (citing JOHN COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF CAPITALISM (Univ. of Wis. Press 1968))). 
116 The notion of an inherent relationship between property rights and the commensurate duties of 
others to honor those rights is generally attributed to Wesley Hohfeld. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 32 (1913) 
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beled several types of asset-related authority beyond exclusion rights as prop-
erty rights, including rights to access or possess an asset, to manage its use, to 
claim any accessions or products of it, or to sell or lease it to others.117 Several 
legal realists have championed this liberal view of property,118 arguing that 
exclusion rights are merely one among many sticks or “rights” incident to 
property ownership.119 Even Ronald Coase seemed to generally embrace a 
“bundle of rights” conception of property.120 
One concerning implication of a liberal “bundle of rights” view of proper-
ty, however, is its suggestion that an asset owner can lose even exclusion rights 
in an asset without deserving anything in return for that loss.121 Such a view is 
also arguably inconsistent with the prevailing notion that property entitlements 
are inherently in rem rights, meaning that—with some limited exceptions—
                                                                                                                           
(noting that “‘[d]uty’ and ‘right’ are correlative terms” such that, “if X has a right against Y that he 
shall stay off the former’s land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to 
stay off the place”). In short, property owners do not hold rights against things; instead, they hold 
rights against others in relation to things. 
117 See, e.g., Schlager & Ostrom, supra note 115, at 250–51 (identifying rights of access, with-
drawal, management, exclusion, and alienation as types of “property rights”). Schlager and Ostrom 
have suggested, among other things, that rights of alienation were “crucial for the efficient use of 
resources” and that “[a]lienation rights, combined with rights of exclusion, produce incentives for 
owners to undertake long-term investments in a resource.” Id. at 256. Others, including Thomas Mer-
rill, have suggested that alienation rights are non-essential to property. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, 
The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2079 (2012) (“I do not believe that alienation is 
essential to property strategy. When the property strategy is supported by social norms . . . there is 
typically no right of alienation.”). 
118 For a thorough examination and rigorous critique of the analogy of property to a bundle of 
sticks, see Penner, supra note 112. In Penner’s words, the “prevalence” of the bundle of rights para-
digm throughout U.S. property law is “undeniable.” Id. at 713. Property law scholars have been using 
the “bundle of sticks” analogy for well over a century. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARA-
DOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 129 (1928) (using the phrase “bundle of power and privileges”); JOHN 
LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 43 (1888) (using the 
phrase “bundle of rights”). 
119 Penner, supra note 112, at 719 (“[T]he concept of property is often said to refer to a ‘bundle of 
rights’ that may be exercised with respect to that object—principally the rights to possess the proper-
ty, to use the property, to exclude others from the property, and to dispose of the property by sale or 
by gift . . . .” (citing Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 509 (Cal. 1990) (en banc))). 
120 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J.L. 
& ECON. S77, S82–S83 (2011) (describing Coase’s apparent subscription to legal realists’ “bundle of 
rights” view of property). 
121 See, e.g., People v. Walker, 90 P.2d 854, 855 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939) (“Since property or ti-
tle is a complex bundle of rights, duties, powers and immunities, the pruning away of some or a great 
many of these elements does not entirely destroy the title . . . .”). Legal realists have long favored the 
“bundle of sticks” view of property because of its potential to provide greater flexibility to reallocate 
property interests to advance various public policy goals. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 120, at 
S81–S82 (asserting that legal realists favor the bundle of sticks view of property because of its capaci-
ty to “facilitate more extensive collective control over property, especially through programs of redis-
tribution”). 
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they are intended to be enforceable against all others.122 Although rights to 
manage how an asset is used and to capture increases in its value over time 
often accompany exclusion authority under more comprehensive conceptions 
of property ownership,123 such additional asset-related entitlements seldom 
have much value to a holder who lacks broad exclusion authority.124 Relatively 
high demoralization costs thus often result when a law or government action 
shifts exclusion rights. 
In short, although the question of what constitutes property under modern 
law is far from settled, most courts and commentators seem to agree that, at a 
minimum, property inherently involves in rem rights to exclude.125 And because 
                                                                                                                           
122 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 120, at S81 (describing in rem property rights as rights that 
create “duties of noninterference in all persons”). The notion that exclusion rights are an essential 
characteristic of property is also consistent with several of property law’s most unbending doctrines. 
For instance, under conventional trespass doctrine, unauthorized physical intruders are strictly liable 
even if their intrusions cause no measurable injury to the landowner. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, 
PROPERTY 30 (5th ed. 2017) (noting that nominal damages are typically available for trespass “with-
out proof of harm to the property” and that, “because actual compensatory damages are often low to 
nominal, courts may award punitive damages as a means to deter trespasses from occurring”). 
123 Thomas Merrill’s characterizations of property go beyond mere exclusion rights to encompass 
these inherently commensurate rights. Merrill describes these additional elements of property owner-
ship as “residual managerial authority” and “residual accessionary rights.” Merrill, supra note 117, at 
2068. Residual accessionary rights also include the right to claim any new resources emerging from an 
asset over time. Id. at 2068–70. On the other hand, as Merrill has noted, even property “pluralists,” 
who embrace a much more flexible conception of property, “agree that exclusion is an ever-present 
element in identifying something as property.” Id. at 2067 (citing HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VAL-
UES AND INSTITUTIONS 37 (2011)). 
124 Concededly, the corollary of this statement is also arguably true: rights to exclude tend not to 
be particularly valuable without the ancillary rights that are typically commensurate with them. See id. 
at 2068 (referring to residual management authority and residual accessionary authority, and noting 
that “[t]he right to exclude is critical not for its own sake, but because it yields these two further at-
tributes”). There are also surely a few types of situations in which a right other than exclusion is most 
highly valued. See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter et al., In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1080 
(2009) (arguing that, in the case of cultural property, stewardship or governance rights are sometimes 
even more valuable and essential than exclusion rights). 
125 The most famous characterization of rights to exclude as the essence of property is William 
Blackstone’s centuries-old description of property as that “sole and despotic dominion which one man 
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other 
individual in the universe.” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. Modern property law 
scholars seem to at least generally agree that exclusion rights are a critical attribute of property. See, 
e.g., Merrill, supra note 114, at 971–72 (declaring that “[t]he consensus view of scholars” is “that the 
right to exclude is an essential feature of common-law property,” and calling rights to exclude an 
“invariant attribute of all common-law property”). The Supreme Court has likewise repeatedly af-
firmed the notion that the right to exclude is a vital aspect of property in takings cases over the years. 
See id. at 973 (“The Court in previous takings cases has repeatedly described the right to exclude 
others as ‘one of the most essential’ rights of property, ‘one of the most treasured’ rights, or some-
thing ‘universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right.’” (first citing Dolan v. City 
of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); then citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 
458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982); and then citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–80 
(1979))). 
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laws that shift these unique, in rem exclusion entitlements tend to generate ele-
vated demoralization costs, it is worthwhile to more closely examine them.126 
III. LAWS THAT SHIFT ONE PROPERTY ENTITLEMENT AT A TIME 
Having defined entitlement-shifting rules and outlined some basic princi-
ples and approaches for analyzing them, this Article now turns it focus to some 
specific examples.127 As highlighted above, shifts of property entitlements—as 
opposed to shifts involving more generic legal entitlements—often entail addi-
tional demoralization costs and thus often warrant additional scrutiny.128 Ac-
cordingly, all of the examples in this Part are of rules and actions that shift a 
single property entitlement. Part IV below then examines rules and actions that 
shift numerous property entitlements all at once. 
All else equal, laws that shift a single property entitlement tend to gener-
ate lower demoralization costs than those that shift many entitlements in one 
fell swoop. Indeed, some such single-entitlement-shifting laws are valuable 
tools for promoting more optimal long-term uses of scarce resources. By con-
trast, some other examples of these laws single out and disproportionately bur-
den citizens in unjust and inefficient ways that nonetheless escape the reach of 
existing takings laws. Section A of this Part highlights two types of entitle-
ment-shifting rules that arguably effectuate shifts in title itself—adverse pos-
session doctrine and certain civil assert forfeiture laws.129 Section B focuses on 
entitlement-shifting rules that seem to effectually terminate title to certain 
property under prescribed circumstances.130 Section C then describes a couple 
types of entitlement-shifting rules that shift something less than full title.131 
A. Title-Shifting Rules 
The most straightforward property entitlement-shifting rules are those that 
effectuate shifts in title itself.132 Although Bell and Parchomovsky referred to 
these powerful rules as “title-shifting pliability rules,”133 for the reasons speci-
fied above, this Article simply refers to such rules as “title-shifting rules.”134 
                                                                                                                           
 126 See infra notes 127–210 and accompanying text. 
 127 See infra notes 132–210 and accompanying text. 
128 See supra notes 63–73 and accompanying text. 
 129 See infra notes 132–171 and accompanying text. 
 130 See infra notes 172–193 and accompanying text. 
 131 See infra notes 194–210 and accompanying text. 
 132 See infra notes 137–171 and accompanying text.  
133 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 54 (describing “title shifting pliability rules” as 
rules “under which a preset condition triggers the transfer of property rule protection from one enti-
tlement holder to another”). 
134 See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
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The following are descriptions and analyses of two real-world examples of this 
type of rule. Subsection 1 discusses adverse possession.135 Subsection 2 dis-
cusses civil asset forfeiture laws.136 
1. Adverse Possession 
The common law’s adverse possession doctrine is a prototypical example 
of a title-shifting rule.137 Adverse possession laws originated out of claims for 
ejectment against unauthorized occupiers of land.138 When an adverse posses-
sion claim is successful, the original owner’s title to the affected property is 
extinguished and new title is simultaneously recognized in a totally new and 
different party.139 In most jurisdictions, adverse possessors are not required to 
compensate original owners in connection with this involuntary transfer of ti-
tle, so successful claims result in shifts of property entitlements. 
Adverse possession laws can arguably serve some valuable policy func-
tions. The threat of losing title under these laws may encourage landowners to 
more vigilantly monitor their property and continue putting it to valuable use 
over time.140 These doctrines may also incentivize non-property holders to 
keep an eye out for ignored property assets and to take actions that ultimately 
help put ignored property back into productive use.141 
At the same time, adverse possession laws can be notoriously rigid and 
unforgiving. These laws reward extended trespassing or squatting, especially 
in the many jurisdictions where establishing adverse possession requires no 
                                                                                                                           
 135 See infra notes 137–150 and accompanying text. 
 136 See infra notes 151–171 and accompanying text. 
 137 See infra note 139 and accompanying text. 
138 When an individual squats on land belonging to someone else for a long period of time, even-
tually the statute of limitations for the true owner to bring an ejectment claim expires, and the squatter 
effectively takes title. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 113, at 170 (“The doctrine of adverse pos-
session evolved from judicial decisions resolving disputes over the application of the statute of limita-
tions for recovery of possession of property.”). 
139 See SINGER, supra note 122, at 295 (stating that adverse possession is established when there 
is “(1) actual possession that is (2) open and notorious, (3) exclusive, (4) continuous, and (5) adverse 
or hostile (6) for the statutory period”). Although adverse possession doctrine technically involves an 
extinguishment of title in the original owner, successful adverse possession claims are classified in 
this Article as title-shifting rules rather than title-terminating rules because the extinguished title al-
ways simultaneously vests in an identifiable new party. 
140 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 66 (stating that the adverse possession doctrine 
“deters careless behavior on the part of property owners by subjecting careless owners to the risk of 
title loss”). 
141 See id. at 69 (noting that adverse possession doctrine “is designed to discourage underutiliza-
tion of the property as well as to reward adverse possessors for bringing property back into active 
use”). 
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showing of good faith.142 And immediately upon the expiration of the applica-
ble statute of limitations, a successful adverse possessor instantaneously transi-
tions from having no legal rights in the affected parcel to having a valid claim 
for fee simple title.143 
The relatively low demoralization costs associated with adverse posses-
sion laws may help to explain why they have subsisted in the common law for 
so long. Claimants must prove a strict and detailed set of elements to prevail 
under adverse possession claims, which helps to ensure that successful claims 
are rare and difficult to achieve.144 Because it is usually easy, with just a little 
bit of vigilance, for property owners to avoid losing assets by adverse posses-
sion, few citizens have good reasons to fret about the prospect of it.145 Moreo-
ver, most owners who allow others to continuously and openly possess their 
assets for several years are thereby signaling that they place a relatively low 
value on them and thus tend to suffer only modestly from losing ownership 
rights under the doctrine. 
On the other hand, the settlement costs avoided by applying versions of 
adverse possession doctrine that require no compensation to original owners 
are also quite low, suggesting that amending such laws to require claimants to 
compensate original owners would likely improve their overall efficiency. 
Compensation requirements would surely introduce some new costs, but those 
costs would likely be offset by the demoralization cost reductions that would 
also result from requiring compensation.146 
Requiring successful adverse possessors to compensate original owners 
before taking title effectively converts adverse possession laws from title-
                                                                                                                           
142 This type of squatting most recently drew attention as numerous squatters moved into fore-
closed homes in the wake of the 2008 mortgage crisis. See generally Kristine S. Cherek, From Tres-
passer to Homeowner: The Case Against Adverse Possession in the Post-crash World, 20 VA. J. SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 271, 271 (2012) (“This Article examines the doctrine of adverse possession as it may be 
used, and as it is currently being used, with respect to residential properties that stand vacant as a 
result of foreclosure actions.”). 
143 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 55 n.89. 
 144 See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
145 Concededly, misunderstandings about the adverse possession doctrine may lead some citizens 
to engage in paranoid behavior to avoid having it applied to them. See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg 
Homes, 563 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Wis. 1997) (noting that the plaintiff landowners were “sensitive about 
allowing others on their land because they had lost property valued at over $10,000 to other neighbors 
in an adverse possession action” years earlier). 
146 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 113, at 1014–15 (identifying several potential issues that 
would arise if liability rules applied to adverse possession, including what to do if the true owner 
cannot be located, when to value the property for purposes of setting compensation, and whether to 
require compensation in all adverse possessions or only in those instances involving bad faith (citing 
Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122 
(1985))). 
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shifting rules into classic pliability rules.147 Unfortunately, although commen-
tators have advocated for, or highlighted the possibility of, adding compensa-
tion requirements to adverse possession laws for decades, they appear to have 
persuaded very few courts or legislatures.148 Lawmakers in at least one state 
have embraced this pliability rule approach: a Colorado statute specifically 
authorizes courts to require adverse possessors to pay compensation as a con-
dition of taking title.149 As of 2020, however, no other states had followed suit, 
so adverse possession laws applicable in most of the country continue to shift 
property entitlements.150 
2. Civil Asset Forfeiture Laws 
Some civil asset forfeiture laws also function as title-shifting rules, and 
these laws have stirred considerably more controversy than adverse possession 
laws in recent years.151 Civil asset forfeiture laws generally authorize law en-
forcement agencies to claim ownership of private assets that were derived from 
or used to commit crimes. For example, under the federal Controlled Sub-
stances Act, if a citizen uses an automobile to deliver illicit drugs, a govern-
ment agency may be authorized to seize the car and ultimately take title to it.152 
Governments usually sell such forfeited assets and use at least some of the 
proceeds of those sales to supplement their operating budgets.153 
                                                                                                                           
147 Bell and Parchomovsky expressly mention the use of classic pliability rules as one possible 
means of improving upon the adverse possession doctrine’s existing rigid rule. See Bell & Par-
chomovsky, supra note 4, at 70 (“States unsympathetic to adverse possession . . . may also employ a 
classic pliability rule in this context . . . .”). 
148 See, e.g., id. at 70–71 (noting the possibility of a rule that provides merely a call option to ac-
quire land after establishing adverse possession, or a rule that requires the auctioned sale of adversely 
possessed land and the splitting of the auction proceeds between the adverse possessor and the origi-
nal owner); Noel Elfant, Comment, Compensation for the Involuntary Transfer of Property Between 
Private Parties: Application of a Liability Rule to the Law of Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 
758, 761–62 (1984) (“[I]n all cases of adverse possession, the right that vests in the adverse possessor 
should be a right to purchase the property interest in question from the original owner for a judicially 
determined compensation equal to the market value of the property interest at the time the right to 
purchase vested in the adverse possessor.”). 
149 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-41-101(5)(a) (West 2021) (authorizing Colorado courts to 
award compensation in successful adverse possession cases “if the court determines in its discretion 
that an award of compensation is fair and equitable under the circumstances”). 
 150 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 325 (West 2011) (establishing adverse possession require-
ments in California); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.021–.030 (West 1985) (establishing 
adverse possession requirements in Texas). 
 151 See infra note 156 and accompanying text. 
152 Caleb Nelson, The Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 125 YALE L.J. 2446, 2448 (2016) (cit-
ing 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), (h)). 
153 For instance, in February 2019, President Trump announced his administration’s intention to 
use six hundred million dollars from the Treasury Department’s civil asset forfeiture fund to help pay 
for portions of a border wall between the United States and Mexico. See Alan Neuhauser, Trump Taps 
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Civil asset forfeiture laws typically do not violate the Takings Clause, 
even though they arguably authorize governments to “take” privately held as-
sets and to eventually put those assets to “public use” by using sale proceeds to 
help fund government operations.154 The inapplicability of takings doctrine to 
these forfeitures makes sense because inserting a just compensation require-
ment into them would undermine their core purposes of deterring and punish-
ing criminal activity.155 On the other hand, asset forfeiture laws that allow 
agencies to go too far in unilaterally taking title to private assets as a form of 
punishment can potentially operate as costly title-shifting rules. 
Civil asset forfeiture laws have recently drawn increased scrutiny in and 
out of courts for facilitating the redistribution of millions of dollars in valuable 
assets from private citizens to government agencies.156 Much of this criticism 
of civil forfeiture laws has centered on arguments that there are inadequate 
legal safeguards in place to prevent government agencies from abusing 
them.157 Because civil and administrative forfeitures are in rem actions, gov-
ernments often must satisfy only a lesser “preponderance of the evidence” 
standard to prevail on forfeiture claims and thus sometimes do so even when 
                                                                                                                           




154 See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452 (1996) (holding that a private citizen was not enti-
tled to just compensation under the Takings Clause, following a civil asset forfeiture, because the 
government had “already lawfully acquired” the assets in question “under the exercise of governmen-
tal authority other than the power of eminent domain”). 
155 See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 603 (1993) (stating that “the legislative history con-
firms that Congress understood the provisions” of the federal asset forfeiture laws at issue in the case 
“as serving to deter and to punish”). Emphasizing these laws’ unique features, Professor Madeline 
Morris has referred to some criminal forfeiture laws as “uncompensated takings” rules. Madeline 
Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 877–78 (1993). 
156 See, e.g., Peter J. Boettke et al., Federalism and the Police: An Applied Theory of “Fiscal At-
tention,” 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 907, 923 (2017) (“[L]ocal police have been found using civil asset forfei-
ture funds to purchase such things as margarita and popcorn machines, flat-screen TVs, a five million 
dollar helicopter, and many other items that state law would typically consider as an ‘inappropriate’ 
use of funds.”); Michael van den Berg, Comment, Proposing a Transactional Approach to Civil Asset 
Forfeiture Reform, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 867, 876 (2015) (noting that the government seized $4.2 bil-
lion in assets in 2012 under civil asset forfeiture provisions from the 1984 Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act). 
 157 See, e.g., van den Berg, supra note 156, at 869 (noting that “[w]hile the practice [of civil asset 
forfeiture] once had reputable roots, it has become a tool with enormous potential for abuse,” and 
proposing “specific recommendations for reform”). 
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there is no corresponding criminal conviction.158 In fact, some administrative 
asset forfeiture actions do not even involve a formal judicial process.159 
As state and local law enforcement agency fiscal budgets have shrunk 
over time, many governments have grown increasingly reliant on income 
streams generated from sales of assets seized under forfeiture laws.160 This 
growing reliance has predictably incentivized some governments to search for 
ways to seize even more private property,161 and increases in the volume and 
value of seized assets in some parts of the country suggests that many govern-
ment agencies have been doing just that.162 In jurisdictions where local law 
enforcement agencies are permitted to retain larger percentages of the proceeds 
of seized assets, incentives to increase asset seizures are only amplified.163 
The relatively low demoralization costs associated with many civil asset 
forfeiture laws may partly explain why strong versions of these laws have sub-
sisted in some jurisdictions for many years. Knowing that government agen-
cies can legally seize private assets obtained through or used in connection 
with serious crimes is not likely to stoke strong demoralizing fears in the ma-
jority of citizens, who are generally law-abiding and thus recognize that such 
laws are unlikely to ever apply to them. 
On the other hand, the demoralization costs—and corrective and distribu-
tive justice concerns—associated with civil asset forfeiture laws escalate when 
government entities begin going too far in seizing assets.164 Because the Tak-
                                                                                                                           
158 Nelson, supra note 152, at 2450 n.24 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)). 
159 See STEFAN D. CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES § 1-4, at 10–11 
(2d ed. 2013) (noting that most of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency’s forfeiture claims take the 
form of “administrative” claims that involve no judicial action). 
 160 See Boettke et al., supra note 156, at 908–09 (“Specifically, federal government transfers and 
aid soften the budget constraint of local police, and thereby alter the payoffs of local police depart-
ments to direct their resources and attention to their new funding sources—mainly, the U.S. federal 
government.”). 
161 See David W. Rasmussen & Bruce L. Benson, Rationalizing Drug Policy Under Federalism, 
30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 679, 715 (2003) (“Asset forfeiture laws . . . encourage more drug enforcement 
because . . . most of the proceeds of these in rem proceedings go to the agency.”). 
162 See, e.g., Luis S. Rulli, Seizing Family Homes from the Innocent: Can the Eighth Amendment 
Protect Minorities and the Poor from Excessive Punishment in Civil Forfeiture?, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 1111, 1120 (2017) (reporting that the U.S. Department of Justice’s federal asset forfeiture fund has 
increased from $338 million in 1996 to more than $2 billion in 2016). 
163 See, e.g., DICK CARPENTER II ET AL., INST. FOR JUST., POLICING FOR PROFIT 132–33 (2d ed. 
2015), https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/policing-for-profit-2nd-edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/
FE45-AK3T] (giving Texas a “D+” grade for its civil asset forfeiture laws, in part, because the state’s 
laws typically allow about 70% of the monetary proceeds from seized assets to go to the law enforce-
ment agency that executed the seizure, thereby creating a “strong incentive to seize property”). 
164 The term “corrective justice” is defined and described in Part II above. See supra notes 91–94 
and accompanying text. To the extent that civil asset forfeiture laws are disproportionately enforced 
against socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals, they may implicate distributive justice issues as 
well. For more on distributive justice, see supra notes 83–90 and accompanying text. 
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ings Clause is unequipped to address the corrective justice concerns that can 
arise under civil asset forfeiture laws, challengers of these laws typically base 
their claims instead on the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.165 In 
essence, such arguments maintain that when the value of private assets seized 
in connection with an alleged crime vastly exceeds an appropriate monetary 
penalty for the crime, a government’s act of seizure and claiming of title may 
constitute an unconstitutionally excessive fine.166 
Excessive Fines Clause-based arguments against civil forfeiture laws are 
gradually finding success in the courts, suggesting that constitutional con-
straints on this type of title-shifting rule may be improving over time. The U.S. 
Supreme Court expressly held in Austin v. United States a quarter century ago 
that civil asset forfeitures were subject to constraints under the Eighth 
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause to the extent that they “punished” 
wrongdoers.167 In the 2019 case of Timbs v. Indiana, the Supreme Court further 
held that the Excessive Fines Clause was incorporated against the states under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the Clause was thus also applicable to 
state and local civil asset forfeitures.168 
Unfortunately, despite the holdings in Austin and Timbs, as well as vari-
ous other court decisions and reforms aimed at limiting asset forfeiture pow-
ers,169 governments throughout much of the country continue to use asset for-
feiture laws to generate substantial revenue in ways that unjustifiably shift 
some property entitlements.170 More definitive tests and standards are still 
needed in most jurisdictions to help law enforcement agencies and courts ade-
                                                                                                                           
165 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed . . . .”). 
 166 See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 603 (1993). 
167 See id. at 602 (holding a civil asset forfeiture under a particular statute to be “a monetary pun-
ishment” that is “subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause”). 
168 139 S. Ct. 682, 686–87, 690–91 (2019). 
169 The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA) also placed constraints on civil asset 
forfeitures. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (2002); see 
also Rachel L. Stuteville, Comment, Reverse Robin Hood: The Tale of How Texas Law Enforcement 
Has Used Civil Asset Forfeiture to Take from Property Owners and Pad the Pockets of Local Gov-
ernment—The Righteous Hunt for Reform Is On, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1169, 1180–81 (2014) (de-
scribing various new constraints on civil asset forfeiture under CAFRA, but noting that “there is also 
some belief that CAFRA is still not as comprehensive as it could be”); Andrew J. Weinstein & Barrie 
A. Dnistrian, ‘Timbs v. Indiana’: Much Ado About Nothing or a Wave in the Sea of Change?, LAW.COM 
(June 4, 2019), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/06/04/timbs-v-indiana-much-ado-about-
nothing-or-a-wave-in-the-sea-of-change/?slreturn=20190708143022 [https://perma.cc/BTD3-KP7E] 
(describing multiple recent Supreme Court cases that impose additional constraints on civil asset for-
feiture practices). 
170 See Note, How Crime Pays: The Unconstitutionality of Modern Civil Asset Forfeiture as a 
Tool of Criminal Law Enforcement, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2390 (2018) (reporting that “the Justice 
and Treasury departments alone received nearly $4.5 billion in forfeiture proceeds in 2014” and that 
“individual states have taken in as much as $46 million in a single year from the practice”). 
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quately distinguish legitimate, remedial asset forfeitures from excessive, op-
portunistic ones. Although an examination of such possible tests lies outside 
the scope of this Article, a growing body of academic literature focused on as-
set forfeitures offers hope that meaningful progress in this area may be on the 
horizon.171 
B. Title-Terminating Rules 
“Title-terminating rules” comprise a second distinct category of property 
entitlement-shifting rules.172 Title-terminating rules shift title from private par-
ties to the shared commons and thus effectively terminate title to the assets 
involved.173 Although Bell and Parchomovsky characterized at least some title-
terminating rules as “zero order pliability rules,” or rules that provide “proper-
ty rule protection . . . succeeded by a no-liability rule,” the fact that original 
title holders lose all asset-related rights under these laws suggests that they 
actually shift entitlements.174 Unlike the title-shifting rules described above, 
which shift title to a single private party, title-terminating rules permanently 
authorize any and all others to use or claim a formerly private asset after a 
                                                                                                                           
171 See, e.g., Kevin Arlyck, The Founders’ Forfeiture, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1449 (2019) (examin-
ing the constitutional protections against civil forfeiture through a historical lens); Rebecca J. Huss, 
Ensuring Effective Tools for a Challenging Task: Amending the Animal Welfare Act’s Animal 
Fighting Venture Civil Asset Forfeiture Provision, 78 U. PITT. L. REV. 399, 402, 404 (2017) (discuss-
ing the “issues that arise when law enforcement is considering seizing animals that may be part of an 
animal fighting operation” and “consider[ing] arguments made by both proponents and opponents of 
[asset forfeiture] laws”); Nelson, supra note 152, at 2452 (“evaluat[ing] the constitutionality of civil 
and administrative forfeiture from the perspective of . . . originalism . . .”); Rulli, supra note 162, at 
1111 (proposing a new constitutional test for excessiveness of civil forfeitures); Vanita Saleema 
Snow, From the Dark Tower: Unbridled Civil Asset Forfeiture, 10 DREXEL L. REV. 69, 69 (2017) 
(describing “how racially biased policing results in law enforcement disproportionately seizing Afri-
can Americans’ property . . . [and attempting to use] issues of protest movements as a vehicle to move 
the Supreme Court to change discriminatory standards under forfeiture statutes”). 
 172 See infra notes 173–175 and accompanying text. 
 173 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 39. 
174 Id. Retroactive applications of the genericism doctrine in trademark law are one of the two 
types of zero-order pliability rules that Bell and Parchomovsky mentioned in their article. Id. at 44–
49. The other type was patent and copyright laws, which create certain exclusive rights that ultimately 
terminate at the end of statutory time periods. Id. at 39–44. Patent and copyright laws are not exam-
ples of entitlement-shifting rules because the entitlements that patent and copyright holders possess 
are explicitly limited and fixed in duration from the first day they are issued and thus more closely 
resemble a term-of-years leasehold interest (or, for copyrights, a life estate interest plus a term of 
years). Because of their pre-set expiration, they create none of the demoralization costs or justice 
issues associated with property entitlement shifting highlighted in Part II above. See supra notes 53–
98 and accompanying text. 
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triggering event.175 The following are brief descriptions and analyses of two 
examples of this type of rule.176 
1. Trademark Law’s Genericism Doctrine 
One clear example of a title-terminating rule is the genericism doctrine in 
trademark law.177 Under retrospective applications of this doctrine, a trademark 
that was formerly distinctive and legally enforceable becomes generic through 
overly broad use and thereby loses trademark protection—a transition known as 
“genericide.”178 Genericide effectively shifts a property entitlement—authority 
to exclude all others from using a particular mark—from the trademark holder to 
the public.179 Nevertheless, the public generally holds only open-access rights 
and no exclusion rights after such a shift, suggesting that the rule actually extin-
guishes all property entitlements associated with the mark.180 
Shifts in property entitlements occurring under the genericism doctrine 
often generate positive allocative efficiency gains.181 When a trademarked 
word or image becomes increasingly generic and less clearly tied to a particu-
lar producer over time, the mark’s value to its holder diminishes and the poten-
                                                                                                                           
175 Bell and Parchomovsky described zero-order pliability rules as ones under which, upon the 
occurrence of some “triggering event, the initial entitlement holder loses the ability to exercise proper-
ty rule protection . . . over her property,” and “[i]nstead, [the entitlement holder must allow] all com-
ers [to] use the property free of charge.” Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 39. 
 176 See infra notes 177–193 and accompanying text. 
177 Despite classifying the genericism doctrine as a zero-order pliability rule, Bell and Par-
chomovsky seem to recognize that genericism doctrine effectively reallocates valuable entitlements. 
See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 48 (“[T]he genericism doctrine is an ex post mechanism 
for reallocating generic terms to a higher valued user: the public, consumers, and competitors alike.”). 
178 Published references to “genericide” are far too numerous to cite here exhaustively. Bell and 
Parchomovsky offered numerous representative examples in their article of formerly trademarked 
terms that subsequently lost protection when they became too generic. See id. at 47 (listing “‘aspirin,’ 
‘cola,’ ‘thermos,’ ‘corn-flakes,’ ‘yo-yo,’ ‘trampoline,’ ‘escalator,’ and ‘linoleum’” as examples). 
179 Genericide likewise extinguishes other core entitlements associated with the trademark, in-
cluding entitlements to license rights in the mark to others and to ultimately sell or otherwise dispose 
of the mark. See Neal A. Hoopes, Reclaiming the Primary Significance Test: Dictionaries, Corpus 
Linguistics, and Trademark Genericide, 54 TULSA L. REV. 407, 415 (2019) (explaining that, because 
generic terms belong in the public domain, they “can never serve as a protectable trademark”). 
180 Admittedly, on rare occasions it is possible for a generic mark to regain secondary meaning and 
become a protectable mark again. See Jake Linford, A Linguistic Justification for Protecting “Generic” 
Trademarks, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 110, 124 (2015) (citing Singer sewing machines and Goodyear rub-
ber examples). This is arguably, however, better characterized as the birth of a new trademark right, as 
such protection is based on a secondary meaning that did not exist when the mark fell victim to ge-
nericide. 
181 Bell and Parchomovsky seem to acknowledge as much in their discussion of these issues. See 
Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 48 (stating that the genericism doctrine allows for realloca-
tions of “generic terms to a higher value user,” and thereby “provides a nonmarket mechanism for 
improving allocative efficiency”). 
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tial gains from allowing non-trademark holders to freely use it increase.182 
When potential gains to non-holders from freely using the mark begin to ex-
ceed the mark’s value to its holder, the genericism doctrine furnishes a means 
of shifting the entitlement to its higher-valued users. 
Unfortunately, trademark law’s genericism doctrine probably generates 
demoralization costs in excess of its avoided settlement costs. The doctrine 
essentially punishes highly successful trademark holders by stripping them of 
trademark protection solely because their mark has become too connected to a 
particular product or service—a potential consequence that can understandably 
stoke fears in the holders of popular marks. Indeed, the threat of genericide has 
inspired high-achieving trademark holders of marks such as “Xerox” and 
“Kleenex” to invest heavily in aggressive marketing campaigns seeking to de-
ter consumers from using their marks to generically refer to photocopies or 
facial tissues.183 Moreover, because genericide of valuable trademarks is a fair-
ly rare occurrence and primarily benefits private competitors, the settlement 
costs avoided by not requiring compensation when non-trademark holders 
begin using the mark are modest at best. 
Given the relatively high demoralization costs and low avoided settlement 
costs associated with the genericide doctrine, it is hardly surprising that Bell 
and Parchomovsky characterized the doctrine as suboptimal and suggested 
multiple alternative approaches, all of which would require non-trademark hold-
ers to somehow pay to use generic marks.184 Like adverse possession laws, the 
genericism doctrine arguably would be more efficient and just if it were trans-
formed through such compensation requirements into a type of pliability rule.185 
2. Laws Governing Abandoned Property 
Many abandonment laws are also classifiable as title-terminating rules.186 
Common-law doctrines governing the abandonment of personal property in 
most states provide that, when the conditions for legally abandoning such 
property are met, these assets essentially go “up for grabs” and anyone may 
                                                                                                                           
182 See id. at 47–48 (noting that the genericism doctrine “empowers courts to terminate . . . the 
property rule protection of marks whose value to third parties—i.e., competitors and consumers—
exceeds their value to their original appropriators”). 
183 See JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 349, 349–60 (2d ed. 1996) (describing the advertising efforts of Xerox and Kimberly-
Clark to prevent the genericide of their valuable marks). 
184 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 72 (“Congress could replace the current rule with 
one that grants competitors the right to use dominant marks in exchange for payment.”). 
 185 See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 186 See infra note 187 and accompanying text. 
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possess and thereby claim title to them.187 Although abandonment of fee sim-
ple interests in real property is generally disallowed under common law, it is 
relatively easy to legally abandon an easement, water right, or mineral right.188 
Abandonment of chattels is also generally permitted at common law.189 Be-
cause claimants of abandoned assets may potentially resurrect and claim the 
property entitlements at issue for themselves, at least one scholar has sensibly 
argued that abandonment doctrines more accurately involve delayed title shift-
ing.190 However, because there is often no known transferee at the time of 
abandonment under these doctrines, they are categorized here as title-
terminating rules. 
Like shifts in property entitlements occurring under the genericism doc-
trine, shifts resulting from abandonment laws likely increase allocative effi-
ciency much of the time. Rational, self-interested property owners usually opt 
to abandon assets only if they believe that doing so will be more beneficial to 
them than retaining ownership.191 Likewise, few non-owners are likely to at-
tempt to possess and claim an abandoned asset unless they believe that doing 
so will benefit them. Accordingly, by making it possible for assets to fall out of 
private ownership under certain prescribed circumstances, abandonment laws 
are a potentially useful tool for helping assets to flow to higher-valued users. 
A weighing of demoralization costs against avoided settlement costs also 
tends to justify allowing the shifting of property entitlements through aban-
donment doctrines. The demoralization costs arising from the possibility of 
losing property entitlements under abandonment doctrines are fairly low be-
cause the legal requirements under such doctrines are typically sufficient to 
                                                                                                                           
187 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 360–61 (2010) 
(defining abandonment also as “a unilateral, nondestructive means of ridding oneself of ownership”). 
188 See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 504 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1944) (noting that abandonment 
of fee ownership in land, “if permitted at all, is permitted only under rules stricter than those which 
prevail in the case of the abandonment of easements”); see also Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Illusory 
Right to Abandon, 109 MICH. L. REV. 191, 201–02 (2010) (identifying water rights and mineral rights 
as types of “rights related to land use that can be abandoned,” and explaining the basic constraints on 
abandonment of those rights). 
189 Strahilevitz, supra note 187, at 412. 
190 Professor Lior Strahilevitz has effectively argued this point. See id. at 361 (arguing that it is 
more correct to “conceive of abandonment as a transfer, albeit one with a temporal lag built into it”). 
191 Professor Saul Levmore has similarly observed that changed circumstances can sometimes in-
centivize rational self-interested property owners to abandon assets, and that such abandonment can 
even cause private property to devolve into commons property. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Two Stories 
About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S421, S425 (2002) (“[A] farmer might 
cease to maintain fences, and eventually hunters and hikers might have the run of the place; a serious 
price change or technological development might lead to the virtual abandonment of a town, and then 
this ghost town might be available to all who pass through with little thought of boundaries and deeds 
. . . in a state that is accurately described as open access.”). 
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prevent parties from abandoning assets that they actually value.192 Moreover, 
rules requiring claimants of abandoned property to somehow identify and 
compensate former owners would be impractical much of the time, and would 
only slow the flow of abandoned resources to higher-valued users. In sum, so 
long as reasonable constraints are in place to prevent parties from dumping nega-
tive-value assets onto governments, abandonment laws tend to shift property 
entitlements in efficient ways without many ancillary costs and thus arguably 
deserve to persist rather than be rejected or converted into pliability rules.193 
C. Other Shifts of Single Property Entitlements 
The other main category of rules that shift individual property entitle-
ments consists of rules that shift something less than full title.194 Several com-
mon-law doctrines fall within this category, including many that govern pre-
scriptive easements and implied easements. 
The potential efficiency gains, demoralization costs, and avoided settlement 
costs associated with these rules tend to mirror those of the adverse possession 
doctrine described above, which suggests that converting them into pliability 
rules by adding a compensation requirement would be desirable.195 These doc-
trines usually improve allocative efficiency by enabling parties to get critically 
needed legal access to land. To the extent they fail to compensate landowners for 
lost exclusion rights, however, they surely generate demoralization costs in ex-
cess of any avoided settlement costs in some instances. As highlighted below, a 
few states today actually have added compensation requirements to at least some 
of these doctrines, thereby changing them from entitlement-shifting rules into 
classic pliability rules.196 These compensation requirements are appealing in that 
they respect landowners’ longstanding property entitlements while still allowing 
qualifying claimants to gain legal access to and make more optimal uses of 
land.197 Unfortunately, concerns that adding compensation requirements to these 
                                                                                                                           
192 See Strahilevitz, supra note 187, at 362 (“It is widely assumed that property is only abandoned 
when it becomes worthless or when the transaction costs of transferring the property exceed its market 
value.”). For similar reasons, such laws also tend to generate relatively few justice-based concerns. 
 193 See supra notes 191–192 and accompanying text. 
 194 See infra notes 199–210 and accompanying text. 
 195 See supra notes 137–150 and accompanying text. 
196 See infra notes 205–207 and accompanying text. 
197 At least one scholar has recently emphasized the efficiency-promoting benefits of requiring 
compensation in connection with statutory easements involving landlocked property. See Yun-chien 
Chang, Hybrid Rule: Hidden Entitlement Protection Rule in Access to Landlocked Land Doctrine, 91 
TUL. L. REV. 217, 240 (2016) (“Requiring landlocked owners to compensate neighbors is justifiable 
from an economic perspective [because] . . . [c]ompensation forces landlocked owners to internalize 
the costs their passage imposes on neighbors.”). Following his rigorous analysis of these easement 
rules, Professor Yun-chien Chang ultimately advocates for a sophisticated “hybrid rule of limited 
liability rules and residual property rules” to govern these situations. Id. at 256. 
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doctrines would legalize “private takings” and could thus provoke challenges 
under the Takings Clause’s public use requirement seem to at least partly explain 
why more states have yet to embrace this approach.198 
1. Prescriptive Easements 
Prescriptive easement doctrines routinely shift individual property enti-
tlements among landowners.199 Upon establishing the elements of a prescrip-
tive easement claim, a successful claimant receives an easement to access spe-
cific portions of the defendant’s land.200 Typically, recipients of these new pre-
scriptive easements are not required to compensate servient landowners for 
their consequent losses of exclusion rights. When courts legally recognize a 
prescriptive easement without requiring any compensation, they effectively 
shift a valuable property entitlement from the defendant landowner to the new 
easement holder. 
Like adverse possession laws, prescriptive easement laws have drawn 
criticism over the years for their propensity to reward trespassers with property 
rights that could only have otherwise been acquired through voluntary pur-
chase. In the words of one court: 
[W]hy should a willful trespasser receive more favorable treatment 
at the hands of a court of equity than the buyer in a specific perfor-
mance case, an entity exercising the statutory right of eminent do-
main or the innocent creator of a minor encroachment?201 
Despite such arguments, prescriptive easement doctrines persist throughout the 
United States and seldom require recipients of these judicially created ease-
ments to compensate servient landowners.202 
                                                                                                                           
198 See Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 517, 578 (2009) (“[S]everal courts 
have opined that as a result of the Public Use Clause, ‘a “private taking” cannot be constitutional even 
if compensated.’” (citing Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1320 n.5 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc))). 
Bell generally advocates for greater allowance of private takings. Id. at 585. 
 199 See infra note 200 and accompanying text. 
200 See DALE A. WHITMAN ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 366 (4th ed. 2019) (“[I]f the prescrip-
tive acts continue for the period of the statute of limitations, the prescriber acquires rights that corre-
spond to the nature of the use . . . [and thus creates] an easement.”). 
201 Warsaw v. Chi. Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 563, 569 (Ct. App. 1983), rev’d, 676 
P.2d 584 (Cal. 1984). 
202 Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have noted the possibility of requiring compensation under 
prescriptive easement doctrines and thereby applying liability rules when the elements of these doc-
trines are established. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 113, at 1013 (describing how adopting such 
an approach would transform the true owner’s protection from “an entitlement . . . protected by a 
property rule into an entitlement . . . protected by a liability rule”). 
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2. Easements Implied by Necessity, Prior Use, or Estoppel 
Various doctrines recognizing implied easements by necessity, prior use, 
or estoppel can similarly reassign individual property entitlements.203 Implied 
easements by necessity typically arise when the grantee of a newly severed 
portion of a land parcel discovers that the severance and conveyance made the 
new parcel “landlocked,” lacking legal access to a public road.204 In such cas-
es, a court may recognize an easement in favor of the grantee based on an in-
ference that the parties to the deed conveying the parcel intended to include the 
easement. 
In roughly half of U.S. states, parties prevailing on claims of easements 
implied by necessity must compensate landowners at fair market value for 
these newly recognized easement rights.205 Common law rules in most other 
states, however, continue to allow courts to create implied easements by neces-
sity without any compensation requirement—a clear shift of a valuable proper-
ty entitlement.206 Similar common-law doctrines recognize implied easements 
from prior use when a landowner, who has severed and conveyed away a por-
tion of a parcel, had previously used part of the retained land to access or enjoy 
the conveyed portion.207 Courts ordinarily do not require the payment of com-
                                                                                                                           
203 For a detailed review of these easements and an analysis of the prospect of requiring compen-
sation payments in connection with them, see Michael V. Hernandez, Restating Implied, Prescriptive, 
and Statutory Easements, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 75 (2005). 
204 WHITMAN ET AL., supra note 200, at 358 (stating that easements implied by necessity can 
generally arise when a landowner “makes a conveyance of part of that land, retaining the rest; and . . . 
after severance of the two parcels, one of them is ‘landlocked,’ i.e., to reach that parcel, it is ‘neces-
sary’ to pass over the other to reach a public street or road”). 
205 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 113, at 998 (noting that “[a]bout half of the states have 
adopted statutes that provide for condemnation of private easements for access to landlocked or inac-
cessible property” and that these laws require the “landlocked owner” to “pay just compensation (fair 
market value) for the rights so obtained” (citing Sorenson v. Czinger, 852 P.2d 1124, 1127 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1993))). At least one legal scholar has also specifically argued in favor of requiring compensa-
tion in connection with these implied easements. See Hernandez, supra note 203, at 94 (arguing that 
“[b]asic principles of fairness . . . obligate the dominant tenant to compensate the servient tenant” in 
most cases, finding implied easements by necessity). 
206 Admittedly, rules requiring the payment of compensation upon recognition of an implied 
easement by necessity seem inconsistent with the basic premise of this doctrine: that the disputing 
parties intended to include the easement with conveyance of the benefited land and thus would have 
incorporated the easement’s value into their agreed purchase price. On a similar rationale, one could 
argue that newly recognizing such implied easements, without requiring any compensation, does not 
shift an entitlement. This argument, however, overlooks the fact that the easement right would not 
legally exist without operation of the doctrine. In that sense, from a practical standpoint, successful 
applications of the doctrine do indeed shift a property entitlement. 
207 See WHITMAN ET AL., supra note 200, at 361 (identifying the “essential elements” of an 
“easement implied from prior use” as: “(1) the owner of a parcel of land makes a conveyance of part 
of that land, retaining the rest; (2) before the severance of the parcel, the owner was using one of the 
parts to benefit the owner’s use and enjoyment of the other . . .; (3) the use is ‘apparent,’ and (4) the 
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pensation in connection with this type of easement either, although at least one 
scholar has advocated for it.208 
Uncompensated easements or irrevocable licenses may likewise be im-
plied by estoppel in many jurisdictions when a landowner misleads a non-
owner into believing that an easement exists and the non-owner detrimentally 
relies on that misrepresentative statement or conduct.209 Whenever a court ap-
plies one of these doctrines without requiring compensation, the court likewise 
shifts a valuable property entitlement from a landowner to the benefited party.210 
IV. SHIFTING SEVERAL PROPERTY ENTITLEMENTS AT ONCE 
This Part focuses on a second and potentially even more problematic 
class of property entitlement-shifting rules than the one-at-a-time rules just 
described.211 The laws and government actions falling into this second catego-
ry shift hundreds or even millions of property entitlements all at once.212 
Certain types of property entitlements are far more susceptible to mass 
entitlement shifting than others. For instance, one group of particularly vulner-
able entitlements are those that rely heavily on governments for their creation 
or use. As described below, copyright interests fall into this group.213 Copy-
right interests are largely creatures of federal statutory law and thus have his-
torically been easier for the federal government to manipulate in ways that 
amount to entitlement shifting. Rights to transmit signals at certain frequencies 
                                                                                                                           
use is to some extent ‘necessary’ to the continued use and enjoyment of the part it would benefit” 
(citations omitted)). 
208 See Hernandez, supra note 203, at 98 (“A court should not imply an easement by prior use 
contrary to the intent of the parties . . . [but if] it does, the court should award compensation for the 
same policy reasons that justify compensation for an easement implied by necessity.”). 
209 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.10 (AM. L. INST. 2000) (“[T]he 
owner or occupier of land is estopped to deny the existence of a servitude burdening the land when . . . 
(2) the owner or occupier represented that the land was burdened by a servitude under circumstances 
in which it was reasonable to foresee that the person to whom the representation was made would 
substantially change position on the basis of that representation, and the person did substantially 
change position in reasonable reliance on that representation.”). 
210 On justice grounds, Professor Michael K. Hernandez has argued for compensation in the con-
text of these implied easements as well as for implied irrevocable licenses by estoppel. See Hernan-
dez, supra note 203, at 102 (stating that if a recipient of such an implied easement or license “is not 
required to pay compensation, he will obtain a perpetual property interest for free and will be in a 
more advantageous position than if he had negotiated and paid for an easement”). 
 211 See infra note 212 and accompanying text. 
212 Multiple other legal academicians have explored mass entitlement shifts more thoroughly and 
identified additional potential examples of these shifts. See, e.g., T. Nicolaus Tideman, Takings, Mor-
al Evolution, and Justice, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1714, 1714 (1988) (discussing land and natural re-
sources as “common heritage” that “are not properly subject to claims of private ownership”); see also 
Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L. 
REV. 1, 5–6 (discussing different types of disruptions to property). 
213 See infra notes 260–265 and accompanying text. 
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along the electromagnetic spectrum, over which the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) exercises significant governance authority, are also more 
susceptible to shifting for these reasons.214 Federal grazing permits, Western 
water rights, and fishery “catch shares” are similarly rooted in government au-
thority and thus may likewise be at greater risk of shifting to others.215 
Property entitlements that are relatively difficult to define or that reside 
near the outer fringes of established property law also may be more prone to 
shifting. Property theorists have used various names, such as “vexed re-
sources” or “emerging resources,” to describe assets fitting these descrip-
tions.216 At least one pair of scholars even recently advocated for treating these 
types of property entitlements—which they described as residing along the 
“edges” of property law—as uniquely malleable and shift-able in furtherance 
of evolving public policy goals.217 
Unfortunately, as appealing as the flexibility available through liberal 
shifting of property entitlements along the edges of property might seem, it 
often comes at a hefty cost. As some of the examples that follow illustrate, 
treating established property entitlements near the fringes as highly malleable 
                                                                                                                           
214 There has long been active debate as to whether FCC-granted license rights for transmission at 
particular frequencies should be characterized as private property. See, e.g., J. Armand Musey, Broad-
casting Licenses: Ownership Rights and the Spectrum Rationalization Challenge, 13 COLUM. SCI. & 
TECH. L. REV. 307, 342, 351 (2012) (acknowledging that broadcast licenses have the basic features of 
property rights in that their holders possess “the right . . . to possess, use, enjoy, and dispose of a thing 
and to exclude everyone else from interfering with it,” but that license holders nonetheless “have a 
relatively weak argument” for property rights protectable under the Takings Clause (citation omit-
ted)); cf. Krystilyn Corbett, Note, The Rise of Private Property Rights in the Broadcast Spectrum, 46 
DUKE L.J. 611, 634 (1996) (arguing that, even though federal statutory provisions purport to preclude 
the formation of private ownership of broadcast rights in the electromagnetic spectrum, such rights 
“now more closely resemble private property rights” because holders “control the use of their portion 
of the spectrum, to exclude use by others, and to exercise discretion in acquisition and transfer”). 
215 Professor Katrina Wyman categorizes grazing permits, fishery catch shares, and Western wa-
ter rights as “environmental property rights,” and argues that many such rights are “hard to propertize 
as completely as land” and are “incomplete along the dimensions of duration, definition, and breadth 
of use.” Katrina M. Wyman, Second Generation Property Rights Issues, 59 NAT. RES. J. 215, 217, 
229–30 (2019). 
216 See, e.g., Chen, supra note 44, at 47–48 (defining “emerging natural resources” as “naturally 
occurring substances that, while previously not considered valuable, are becoming increasingly sub-
ject to economically viable exploitation because of technological advances or socioeconomic change,” 
and suggesting that “[t]he question of who is to own such resources inevitably accompanies their 
newfound value, particularly for resources that could not be meaningfully captured, modified, or uti-
lized before recent technological innovations”); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Ori-
gins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 799, 928 (2004) (describing submerged lands as “a uniquely vexed resource, in the sense of one 
afflicted by an extraordinarily high degree of legal uncertainty”). 
217 See David A. Dana & Nadav Shoked, Property’s Edges, 60 B.C. L. REV. 753, 822 (2019) (ar-
guing for “recognition of edges as a distinct property category” and not “fetishizing the property 
boundary line” for such category of property, but instead allowing for solutions “that accommodate 
the interests of both the private owner and the public”). 
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can drive up demoralization costs, deter optimal levels of investment, and ena-
ble governments to abuse their entitlement-shifting powers to enrich political 
rent-seekers.218 
Although the Takings Clause places significant constraints on govern-
ments’ powers to shift large numbers of property entitlements all at once, such 
shifts still sometimes occur and may even be justifiable in some cases. As Jus-
tice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously suggested, government activity could 
“hardly go on” if governments were legally obligated to compensate citizens 
for every entitlement-shifting regulatory action.219 In that sense, takings laws 
are an imperfect attempt to balance the competing goals of safeguarding exist-
ing property entitlements and allowing governments to efficiently regulate uses 
of privately-held assets.220 
Unfortunately, distinguishing justifiable mass shifts of property entitle-
ments from unjustifiable ones is often a difficult and complex task. Because 
such shifts inherently involve no compensation to losers, governments do not 
internalize all the costs of effectuating them and thus cannot be trusted to pur-
sue only efficiency-promoting ones. In fact, as public choice theorists might 
predict, governments sometimes seek to shift entitlements primarily to benefit 
themselves or powerful special interest groups that have bought their influ-
ence.221 
Evaluating these types of rules and actions is complicated even further by 
the fact that they tend to generate relatively high demoralization costs but also 
avoid relatively high settlement costs. Requiring compensation in connection 
                                                                                                                           
218 See infra notes 255–294 and accompanying text. 
219 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
220 These issues have enjoyed some additional attention more recently because of language in Jus-
tice Scalia’s 2010 Supreme Court opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection, in which he noted the possibility of a judicial takings doctrine, 
which, if embraced, would impose additional limits on courts’ power to shift property entitlements. 
See 560 U.S. 702 (2010); see also Ilya Somin, Stop the Beach Renourishment and the Problem of 
Judicial Takings, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 92 (2011) (discussing the background of 
Stop the Beach, and arguing “that judicial takings do exist and are forbidden by the Fifth Amend-
ment”); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1449–50 (1990) (“The issue 
in this Article is whether the takings protections also limit the degree to which courts can change 
property law and, if they do, whether the federal courts should actively review the decisions of state 
courts to ensure that state court decisions remain within constitutional bounds.”); The Supreme Court, 
2009 Term—Leading Cases, 124 HARV. L. REV. 299, 300 (2010) (providing an overview of the Stop 
the Beach decision). 
221 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory In-
terpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 230 (1986) (“The major implications 
of interest group theory are that legislation transfers wealth from society as a whole to those discrete, 
well-organized groups that enjoy superior access to the political process, and that government will 
enact laws that reduce societal wealth and economic efficiency in order to benefit these economic 
groups.”). 
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with a mass shift in property entitlements is often likely to generate high set-
tlement costs because of the sheer number of potential claimants involved. 
However, the demoralization costs associated with such rules and actions tend 
also to be relatively high because they feed fears that governments will do 
more mass reshuffling of existing property entitlements in the future. The 
complexity inherent in analyzing these types of rules is illustrated in the fol-
lowing specific examples. 
A. Laws Designating New Contraband Items 
Laws that newly designate certain items as being illegal contraband can 
trigger mass shifts in property entitlements.222 Governments occasionally enact 
laws that declare a particular asset or type of asset to be contraband for the first 
time and order citizens to destroy or forfeit any such assets, offering no com-
pensation in return.223 Owners of newly banned items may sometimes retain 
some limited entitlements in them under such laws.224 However, because those 
limited rights generally do not encompass rights of possession, use, sale, or ex-
clusion from government seizure, such laws and regulations can sweepingly shift 
large numbers of property entitlements from private citizens to governments. 
The recently imposed federal ban on bump stocks—attachments designed 
to accelerate firing on semi-automatic rifles—exemplifies this type of mass 
entitlement-shifting rule. The U.S. Justice Department imposed a ban on bump 
stocks after a man used the devices in a horrifying 2017 mass shooting at a Las 
Vegas outdoor concert.225 The regulation, which was still under court challenge 
as of early 2021, required citizens who owned bump stocks to destroy them or 
forfeit possession of them to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives (ATF) within ninety days or face felony charges.226 Although mar-
ket prices for bump stocks had historically been about two-hundred dollars, the 
                                                                                                                           
 222 See infra notes 223–231 and accompanying text. 
 223 For example, 18 U.S.C. § 1791 makes it illegal for prisoners to possess certain objects while 
incarcerated. Under 18 U.S.C. § 4012, if discovered, these objects will be forfeited to the U.S. gov-
ernment. 
224 See, e.g., People v. Walker, 90 P.2d 854, 855 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939) (“Although it may be 
illegal to own or possess slot machines there yet exists certain rights in the individual who may pos-
sess such a contraband article as against anyone other than the state. The owner at least has the privi-
lege of destroying the machine; he also has the right to surrender it to the authorities.”). 
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federal government was offering no compensation to current owners for de-
struction or forfeiture of their devices.227 
Similar examples of uncompensated new bans on valuable items are scat-
tered across history. For instance, an uncompensated ban on alcohol and alco-
hol-related equipment led to Mugler v. Kansas, a famous early regulatory tak-
ings case in which the Supreme Court found no compensable taking.228 Nearly 
a century later, the Court again found no taking in Andrus v. Allard, a case 
challenging a ban on the sale of eagle feathers.229 Courts have typically justi-
fied such denial of compensation based on broad public policy rationales.230 
Some scholars have questioned the legitimacy of these arguments, and the re-
cent bump stock ban has drawn a serious takings challenge.231 
Case-by-case analyses of new contraband laws are usually needed to de-
termine whether they are cost-justified. Most new bans on items that pose gen-
uine threats to public safety probably generate positive allocative efficiency 
gains. Nonetheless, the settlement costs avoided by not compensating property 
owners for forfeiting a newly banned item do not always exceed the demorali-
zation costs generated from that approach. For instance, although the ATF 
would have incurred a substantial budgetary expense if it had agreed to com-
pensate bump stock owners at fair market value, the fact that bump stocks are 
fairly uncommon suggests that the total payouts likely would have been no 
larger than those made by government agencies in some other contexts. As an 
example, the government paid out roughly $161 million in compensation to 
owners of 3.2 million chickens, turkeys, and other birds that were ordered to 
                                                                                                                           
227 Martin Kaste, Bump Stocks Will Soon Be Illegal, but That’s Not Stopping Sales, NPR (Feb. 4, 
2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/04/691287471/bump-stocks-will-soon-be-illegal-but-thats-not-
slowing-sales [https://perma.cc/7CUF-AL85]. 
228 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
229 444 U.S. 51 (1979). Concededly, because Andrus challenged a ban on sale and entailed no 
threat to exclusion rights in eagle feathers, it arguably involved merely a shift of a generic entitlement 
and not a “property entitlement” as defined in this Article. 
230 The Mugler Court held that the brewing equipment ban at issue in that case was intended to 
protect citizens’ general welfare rather than to conscript private property for public use. 123 U.S. at 
668. The Andrus Court justified the eagle feather sales ban on the grounds that eagle feather owners 
had only lost “one ‘strand’” in their bundle of property rights and had retained rights to possess the 
feathers and make other potentially profitable uses of them. 444 U.S. at 66. 
231 See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1151 (1993) (arguing that Andrus’s up-
holding of an uncompensated ban on the sale of eagle feathers “was troublesome for takings doctrine,” 
and also adding that “not only did the law single out, it also deprived property of virtually all econom-
ic value and took away a property right—the right to alienate”); see also Avery Anapol, Gun Compa-
ny Sues US Over Bump Stock Ban, Claiming $20M in Losses, THE HILL (Apr. 9, 2019), https://thehill.
com/regulation/court-battles/438066-gun-company-sues-us-over-bump-stock-ban-claiming-20-million-
in [https://perma.cc/CD52-SN6X] (“A Texas gun company is suing the U.S. government over the 
newly enacted ban on ‘bump stocks,’ claiming that . . . the government enacted the ban . . . ‘in viola-
tion of the 5th Amendment . . . .’”). 
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be euthanized during an outbreak of Newcastle disease in the early 2000s, and 
then paid out millions more during a subsequent outbreak in 2019.232 
On the other hand, contraband laws can sometimes serve valuable public 
functions. The ATF’s new bump stock ban did not transfer large amounts of 
wealth to any special interest groups,233 and the federal government planned to 
destroy the bump stocks it collected rather than gain financially by redistrib-
uting them for use by police forces, the military, or other government enti-
ties.234 In that sense, although incorporating compensation requirements into 
contraband laws might make them more just and efficient, current versions of 
these laws are less concerning than some of the other examples of attempted 
mass shifts in property entitlements described below.235 
B. Intentional Government Flooding of Private Land 
A more problematic form of mass property entitlement shifting occurs 
when a government entity shifts large numbers of entitlements from private 
parties to itself to evade liability for violating those entitlements.236 The U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) recently attempted this type of mass enti-
tlement shifting after intentionally flooding more than ten thousand private 
homes and businesses in Houston to limit further flooding elsewhere in the city 
during Hurricane Harvey in 2017.237 
                                                                                                                           
232 See Jaclyn Cosgrove, To Stop a Virus, California Has Euthanized More Than 1.2 Million 
Birds. Is It Reckless or Necessary?, L.A. TIMES (June 7, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/
la-me-ln-virulent-newcastle-disease-outbreak-in-southern-california-20190607-story.html [https://
web.archive.org/web/20201211013900/https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-virulent-
newcastle-disease-outbreak-in-southern-california-20190607-story.html] (reporting on the latest New-
castle disease outbreak in California). 
233 For instance, there were no widespread allegations that the ATF’s new ban on bump stocks af-
forded any substantial economic benefits to the manufacturers or sellers of close substitute products 
for bump stocks, who in turn would likely experience a sharp increase in demand due to the bump 
stock ban. 
234 See Laurel Wamsley, Bump Stock Ban Proceeds After Supreme Court Denies Gun Advocates’ 
Request to Halt It, NPR (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/28/707637489/bump-stock-
ban-proceeds-after-supreme-court-denies-gun-makers-request-to-halt-it [https://perma.cc/2KVQ-LZFY] 
(quoting a retailer who formerly sold bump stocks as stating that confiscated bump stocks would be 
“shredded and recycled” by ATF agents). 
 235 See infra notes 236–294 and accompanying text. 
 236 See infra note 237 and accompanying text. 
 237 See Ilya Somin, Is Federal Government Flooding of Houston Homes a Taking?, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/10/31/is-federal-
government-flooding-of-houston-homes-a-taking/ [https://perma.cc/7EJF-8EC3] (reporting on the 
various lawsuits filed by home and business owners after the Corps engaged in “‘controlled release’ 
flooding” in Houston). 
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The Corps initially built the Addicks and Barker dams and flood pools in 
the 1940s to help manage flood risks in the Greater Houston area.238 In con-
nection with those projects, the Corps exercised its eminent domain authority 
and purchased thousands of acres of land from private landowners—a clear 
acknowledgement that those landowners and others in similar situations held 
entitlements against intentional flooding.239 During this time, the Corps also 
could have easily purchased more land or flowage easements from owners of 
lands situated on the fringes of the new flood pools. Of course, the Corps ulti-
mately opted not to do so.240 
The Corps’s decision not to acquire rights to flood more lands near the 
Addicks and Barker flood pools created controversy when Hurricane Harvey 
dumped roughly one trillion gallons of water on Greater Houston in 2017.241 
To mitigate flooding elsewhere, the Corps intentionally allowed the Addicks 
and Barker flood pools to overflow their edges and spill onto adjacent lands, 
many of which housed residential neighborhoods.242 The Corps then refused to 
compensate the thousands of owners of land within these areas for their result-
ing losses—an attempt to shift numerous valuable property entitlements from 
landowners to the government.243 Affected landowners responded by bringing 
                                                                                                                           
238 See Steve Jansen, Barker and Addicks Dams Under a Flood Warning. That’s Never Happened 
Before., HOUS. PRESS (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.houstonpress.com/news/barker-and-addicks-
dams-under-a-flood-warning-that-s-never-happened-before-8343556 [https://web.archive.org/web/
20201126221934/https://www.houstonpress.com/news/barker-and-addicks-dams-under-a-flood-
warning-that-s-never-happened-before-8343556] (reporting on the dams’ history and functionality in 
recent years). 
 239 See Neena Satija et al., Houston Officials Let Developers Build Homes Inside Reservoirs. But 
No One Warned Buyers., TEX. TRIB. (Oct. 12, 2017), https://apps.texastribune.org/harvey-reservoirs/ 
[https://perma.cc/7S74-QG8S] (describing the Corps’s purchase of the Addicks and Barker reservoirs 
and the area’s subsequent development). 
 240 See id. (“[T]he Army Corps . . . bought only about 24,500 acres back when it built Addicks 
and Barker in the 1940s—even though the agency knew at the time that about 8,000 more acres could 
actually flood . . . . Herbert, [a] Fort Bend County judge, said he can’t believe the Corps didn’t buy 
more land back when it built the projects.”). 
 241 Angela Fritz & Jason Samenow, Harvey Unloaded 33 Trillion Gallons of Water in the U.S., 
WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/capital-weather-gang/wp/2017/
08/30/harvey-has-unloaded-24-5-trillion-gallons-of-water-on-texas-and-louisiana/ [https://perma.cc/
SET3-BGVB]. 
 242 Emily Flitter, Houston Residents Confront Officials Over Decision to Flood Neighborhoods, 
REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-storm-harvey-water/houston-residents-
confront-officials-over-decision-to-flood-neighborhoods-idUSKCN1BK0RJ [https://perma.cc/YZX3-
HEYA]. 
 243 See Jeff Jeffrey, Federal Court Holds Army Corps Liable for Flooding Homes in Addicks and 
Barker Reservoirs After Harvey, HOUSTON BUS. J. (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.bizjournals.com/
houston/news/2019/12/18/federal-court-holds-army-corps-liable-for-flooding.html [https://perma.cc/
2NCH-4YXY?type=image] (explaining that before a federal court ordered the Corps to pay landown-
ers just compensation, the Corps had argued that the “flooding is not a compensable taking because it 
was temporary and confined to a single flood event”). 
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takings claims against the Corps for its actions, citing, among other precedents, 
a recent Supreme Court decision holding that temporary government-induced 
flooding could trigger compensable takings.244 
Some of the Corps’s arguments against the Addicks and Barker flooding 
incident claims were essentially pleas for the Court to shift thousands of pri-
vately held property entitlements to the Corps to spare it from liability. One 
such argument was that actions by Mother Nature, not the Corps, resulted in 
violations of the plaintiffs’ property entitlements: it was natural floodwaters 
that filled up the flood pools behind the dams and then spilled onto neighbor-
ing properties.245 The Corps emphasized that Hurricane Harvey was a rare and 
historic flood and noted that other property elsewhere in the city would have 
been damaged and lives potentially lost had the Corps proceeded differently.246 
Of course, a precedent based on such an argument would create troubling 
incentives for future government decisionmakers engaged in flood protection. 
Why would any government willingly pay to acquire flowage easement rights 
and other property interests for a new flood spillway if it knew it would have 
no liability to affected property owners if the spillway was ever actually used 
for its intended purpose? Accordingly, the Court of Federal Claims held that 
the Corps’s initial building of the dams itself constituted “action” sufficient to 
support a takings claim.247 The court emphasized that the Corps “was aware of 
the risk the dams’ designs posed to private property” and could have mitigated 
those risks by acquiring “flowage easements on, or purchasing additional land” 
in the neighboring areas where the flooding ultimately occurred.248 
The Corps’s other main argument against the Addicks and Barker claims 
is perhaps the most common type of rationale made by seekers of mass enti-
tlement shifting: an assertion that the entitlements at issue had never been as-
signed in the first place. Specifically, the Corps claimed that: 
                                                                                                                           
244 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 38 (2012) (“[G]overnment-
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245 See In re Upstream Addicks & Barker (Tex.) Flood-Control Reservoirs, 138 Fed. Cl. 658, 666 
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247 In re Upstream, 138 Fed. Cl. at 666–67. 
248 Id. at 667. 
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(1) Texas law recognizes no property right in keeping property free 
from diversions of water from dams, (2) Texas law recognizes no 
property right vis-à-vis a preexisting flood control structure, and (3) 
the federal Flood Control Act is a longstanding background princi-
ple that limits plaintiffs’ property rights.249 
Fortunately, the court in In re Upstream Addicks & Barker (Tex.) Flood-
Control Reservoirs rejected these assertions and the Corps’s other arguments, 
ultimately holding that the plaintiff landowners held valid property interests in 
not having their land flooded by the government and that the Corps’s actions in 
building the dams caused the flooding.250 As of early 2021, discovery regard-
ing the amount of just compensation payable to affected landowners had been 
continued because of the COVID-19 pandemic, but given the extent of the 
flood damage total payouts were likely to be in the millions of dollars.251 
The mere fact that respecting existing property entitlements by requiring 
compensation in cases like In re Upstream would result in high settlement 
costs does not necessarily justify shifting property entitlements to avoid those 
costs. As suggested above, requiring compensation tends to create more opti-
mal incentives for governments acting in these roles. Requiring compensation 
also limits demoralization costs and thereby encourages more optimal levels of 
investment and economic activity. 
The types of arguments that the Corps made in In re Upstream are likely to 
reemerge in other future contexts as climate change causes sea levels to rise and 
intensifies weather events.252 Hopefully, as laws continue to adapt to a changing 
climate, courts will resist the temptation to embrace entitlement-shifting rules as 
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251 See Audie Cornish, Texas Residents Sue Army Corps of Engineers for Flood Damage During 
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alleging that changes in the Corps’s river management policies had caused increased flooding along 
the river. See generally Edwin H. Smith, Flood Inverse Cases: Proving Actual Causation in a Physical 
Taking by Flooding Case Like Ideker in Light of St. Bernard Parish (Jan. 2019), http://files.ali-
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ZCNW] (providing an overview of the Ideker Theory, which demonstrates that the Corps was respon-
sible for the flood damage on landowners’ property). 
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an adaptation strategy and will instead use liability and pliability rules to pre-
serve appropriate incentives for government actors in these situations.253 
C. Mass Property Entitlement Shifting to Benefit Special Interests 
The most indefensible mass property entitlement-shifting rules and ac-
tions are those clearly driven by private special interests.254 To quote one 
scholar on these abuses: 
Once a state is empowered to manipulate individuals’ property 
rights, special interest groups will devote resources to get the state to 
manipulate property rights in their favor . . . . And other groups will 
expend resources resisting these changes. Such expenditures of oth-
erwise productive resources (rent-seeking) lead to pure deadweight 
social utility loss.255 
Indeed, governments sometimes attempt to misuse their government authority 
to shift large numbers of property entitlements and thereby transfer wealth to 
influential special interest groups.256 Such abuses are not only difficult to justi-
fy from an efficiency perspective because of their tendency to generate high 
demoralization costs; the partiality inherent in them also offends basic notions 
of objective procedural justice.257 
As with many of the other types of property entitlement shifting high-
lighted above, using compensation requirements to convert these laws into pli-
ability rules is often the most straightforward and effective way of improving 
them. Frank Michelman specifically noted that requiring governments to com-
pensate citizens for losses of property interests helps to deter “disguised at-
tempt[s] to redistribute deliberately” citizens’ property interests.258 Numerous 
scholars have similarly argued that requiring just compensation—a liability 
rule approach—acts as a sort of social insurance, using taxpayer dollars to fund 
a system that protects all citizens against the risk of suffering government tak-
ings of their property and ensures they receive reasonable compensation in 
such cases.259 
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 254 See infra notes 255–257 and accompanying text. 
255 Leif Wenar, The Concept of Property and the Takings Clause, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1923, 
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Unfortunately, the government actors and private stakeholders behind 
these egregious entitlement-shifting rules are often proactively seeking to shift 
entitlements as a means of extracting economic rents through the political pro-
cess. The following are descriptions and brief analyses of three fairly recent 
examples of such attempts to shift large numbers of property entitlements to 
benefit influential private parties. 
1. Retroactive Extension of Copyright Durations 
Congress shifted millions of vested property entitlements from the gen-
eral public to existing copyright holders—including some politically powerful 
corporations—when it enacted the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 
(the Bono Act) in 1998.260 The Bono Act extended the duration of copyright 
protection by twenty years for individual authors—from fifty years after their 
death to seventy years after their death.261 Congress applied this extension ret-
roactively, meaning that it generally applied to all copyright interests still en-
forceable on the date the Bono Act first went into effect.262 By giving copy-
right holders twenty more years of exclusion rights, the Bono Act shifted enti-
tlements associated with affected copyrighted materials from the public to 
copyright holders for those additional years. Although these entitlements were 
mere open-access use rights when held by the general public, they became ex-
clusion rights—i.e., property entitlements—once they reached the hands of 
copyright holders. 
Certain copyright holders had much to gain from the Bono Act’s twenty-
year extensions, so it is hardly surprising that special interest pressure appears 
to have heavily influenced its enactment.263 And because the copyrighted mate-
rial at issue had not yet passed into the public domain, the retroactive exten-
                                                                                                                           
cepting costs they might be willing to pay a good deal to avoid.”); Been, supra note 81, at 56–59 (dis-
cussing “the insurance rationale,” which “asserts that government should remedy the private market’s 
failure to provide insurance for legal transitions by providing compensation for such changes”); Law-
rence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. 
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260 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (cod-
ified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–304). 
261 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). 
262 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 112 Stat. 2827. 
263 See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 421 (2002) 
(“Given the lack of strong policy support for term extension, Congress’s passage of the Bono Act can 
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particularly a retroactive one.”). 
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sions survived constitutional scrutiny.264 Indeed, it is quite conceivable that 
Congress could similarly extend valuable copyright protections again at some 
point in the future.265 
The Bono Act’s copyright term extensions are difficult to justify from a 
social welfare perspective. They likely did not increase allocative efficiency 
because they delayed the public’s free use of countless artistic creations for 
twenty years without materially strengthening future incentives to create new 
works.266 The demoralization costs resulting from the extensions were also 
likely substantial because of a widespread sense that special interest influence 
had contributed to the outcome. And the extensions were not justifiable on the 
basis of avoided settlement costs because the thousands of affected copyright 
holders would have had no compensation claims against the federal govern-
ment had Congress simply allowed their copyrights to expire under existing 
laws. Still, despite these deficiencies, Congress enacted the extensions and 
shifted hundreds of thousands of property entitlements, and the threat of simi-
lar future copyright extensions remains.267 
2. Attempts to Shift Property Entitlements in Subsurface Pore Space to 
Mineral Estate Holders 
As technological advancements have increased the value of deep subsur-
face resources in recent years, there have arguably been attempts to shift prop-
erty entitlements in these resources as well.268 “Pore space” is subsurface space 
between porous rock, which is often created after oil and gas extraction.269 Be-
cause there were relatively few conflicts over ownership rights in this space 
until deep horizontal oil drilling techniques were popularized about twenty-
                                                                                                                           
264 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (upholding the retroactive copyright extension 
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and Lochner: Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 
YALE L.J. 2331 (2003) (describing and analyzing the Supreme Court’s Eldred v. Ashcroft decision). 
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 267 See supra notes 260–262 and accompanying text. 
 268 See infra notes 272–274 and accompanying text. 
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five years ago, laws specifically governing these entitlements in some states 
have never been expressly enacted or judicially established.270 Nonetheless, the 
predominant view has historically been that rights in this space are vested in 
surface rights holders.271 Unfortunately, some private stakeholders in the oil 
and gas industry have recently sought to persuade legislatures to reject this 
prevailing rule and instead shift property entitlements in subsurface pore space 
to mineral rights holders. 
One unsuccessful attempt at such mass entitlement shifting arguably oc-
curred in 2011 when the Kansas House Committee on Energy and Utilities 
proposed a new state law to govern property rights in subsurface pore space.272 
Although the existing caselaw in Kansas involving pore space was quite lim-
ited, the leading view was that pore space rights in the state were vested in sur-
face rights holders like they were in most other states.273 Kansas House Bill 
2164, however, would have taken an opposite approach, vesting subsurface 
pore space rights in mineral rights holders.274 
Although a law giving mineral estate holders subsurface pore space rights 
in Kansas might have generated some public policy benefits, it is doubtful that 
those possible benefits are what prompted the bill. Such a law would have 
concentrated pore space rights with a smaller set of parties, potentially making 
it easier to use subsurface pore space to store carbon dioxide from power 
plants and thereby combat climate change. Indeed, the potential usefulness of 
                                                                                                                           
270 See Larry Nettles & Mary Conner, Carbon Dioxide Sequestration—Transportation, Storage 
and Other Infrastructure Issues, 4 TEX. J. OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. 27, 30 (2008) (“[N]ot all jurisdic-
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 273 R. Lee Gresham & Owen L. Anderson, Legal and Commercial Models for Pore-Space Access 
and Use for Geologic CO2 Sequestration, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 9 (2011). 
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this subsurface space for carbon storage prompted Professor John Sprankling 
to advocate for shifting to the government rights in all such space situated 
more than one thousand feet below the surface.275 As of 2021, however, there 
were still no active plans for large-scale carbon capture and storage in Kansas, 
so it is doubtful that this potential public benefit was the primary driver of 
support for Bill 2164.276 
A more plausible explanation for the legislative push to allocate pore 
space to Kansas mineral rights holders involves political pressure from special 
interest stakeholders.277 The bill would have greatly benefited oil and gas in-
dustry players in Kansas had it become law, permitting them to negotiate sole-
ly with mineral rights holders and not with numerous surface rights holders for 
the rights needed to engage in certain types of horizontal drilling, natural gas 
storage, or disposal of fracking wastewater in deep disposal wells.278 In the 
process, the bill would have likely generated substantial demoralization costs 
and contravened distributive justice ideals by regressively redistributing wealth 
from thousands of individual Kansas landowners to a relatively small handful 
of wealthy and politically influential industry parties. 
Kansas House Bill 2164 ultimately failed and, ironically, the Kansas Sen-
ate introduced a bill just one year later that would have instead solidified the 
approach taken by every other state legislature that has addressed the issue and 
made clear that subsurface pore space in Kansas is “vested in the several own-
ers of the surface above.”279 Unfortunately, that bill also failed, so the risk of 
special interest-driven entitlement shifting involving subsurface pore space in 
Kansas remains, as it does in many other jurisdictions.280 
3. Attempts to Shift Property Entitlements in Low Airspace to Drone 
Operators 
One other example of how special interest pressure is driving attempts to 
shift large numbers of property entitlements is the ongoing regulatory battle 
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over low-altitude airspace and small civilian drones.281 Landowners’ rights to 
exclude unwelcome objects from the immediate reaches of airspace above 
their land have been under intense attack over the past decade. In particular, 
large corporations interested in flying commercial drones through the low-
altitude airspace above the nation’s cities and towns have been aggressively 
lobbying Congress and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to impose 
rules that would effectively shift property entitlements in that space from land-
owners to those corporations.282 
Landowners have long held common-law rights to keep unwanted physi-
cal intrusions out of the low-lying airspace immediately above their land. Prior 
to the advent of modern aviation, the common law’s ad coelum doctrine gener-
ally governed the allocation of airspace rights, vesting them in whomever held 
rights in the surface land immediately below.283 Then, relatively soon after air-
planes began coursing the sky, the Supreme Court clarified the scope of land-
owners’ airspace rights in the famous case of United States v. Causby.284 The 
Causby Court held that, although a literal interpretation of the ad coelum rule 
affording landowners indefinite airspace rights above their land up into the 
outer atmosphere had “no place in the modern world,”285 landowners still 
owned the “immediate reaches” of airspace above their parcels—“at least as 
much of the space above the ground as [they] can occupy or use in connection 
with the land.”286 In the decades since Causby, landowners’ property entitle-
ments in the low-altitude space above their land have been repeatedly reaf-
firmed in condominium laws,287 laws governing overhang encroachments,288 
and even in takings laws involving low-lying flight paths near airports.289 
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In recent years, however, a handful of large corporations, including Ama-
zon and Alphabet, have aggressively lobbied the FAA for regulations that would 
effectively strip landowners of their rights to exclude unwanted drones from the 
low airspace above their property.290 If adopted, these regulations would give 
FAA-authorized companies the right to fly drones even at very low heights 
above private land and ignore any objections from landowners below.291 
Suddenly giving a single federal entity power to authorize private intru-
sions over the low airspace above nearly all of the nation’s private land would 
effectively shift property entitlements in that space from millions of individual 
landowners to a few powerful companies—a move that would be difficult to 
justify on efficiency or justice grounds.292 Such an approach would generate 
allocative inefficiencies by stripping landowners and municipalities of their 
ability to help govern uses of this scarce and highly location-specific resource. 
And because landowners have long held rights to exclude unwanted intrusions 
into the low-altitude airspace immediately above their land, the demoralization 
costs of such a move would be substantial. 
By contrast, empowering states and local governments to condemn and 
compensate landowners for easements for drone flight corridors would pro-
mote greater allocative efficiency while also respecting existing property enti-
tlements and thereby mitigating demoralization costs.293 Unfortunately, unless 
Congress enacts statutory language expressly affirming landowners’ rights in 
low-altitude airspace, special interests could soon succeed in convincing the 
FAA to redistribute millions of dollars in value to them by dramatically shift-
ing property entitlements in this space.294 
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CONCLUSION 
Entitlement shifting has been occurring for centuries but is seldom 
acknowledged in analyses involving Calabresi and Melamed’s framework of 
property rules and liability rules. Unlike pliability rules, which toggle between 
property rule and liability rule protection over time, entitlement-shifting rules 
allow entitlements to shift from one entitlement holder to another under certain 
conditions. Although some types of entitlement-shifting rules are common and 
widely accepted, others are baffling outliers—antiquated common-law doc-
trines and divisive statutory oddities that subsist in the gaps and crevices of 
modern law. 
Most property entitlement-shifting rules are legitimate attempts to in-
crease allocative efficiency by reassigning entitlements to higher-valued us-
ers—a facially valid public policy goal. Others, however, pursue that goal in 
ways that are inefficient and unjust. Some of the oldest entitlement-shifting 
rules in the common law could be more efficiently restructured as pliability 
rules, but constitutional restrictions on private takings appear to deter many 
courts and legislatures from embracing that approach. Ironically, perpetuating 
these rules in their entitlement-shifting form often produces outcomes that are 
less efficient and equitable than compensated private takings would be. 
The most troubling entitlement-shifting rules are those that shift large 
numbers of property entitlements as a means of shielding government entities 
from liability or of redistributing wealth to special interests. Although takings 
laws place some constraints on such abuses, their threat persists in certain con-
texts and could grow as technological innovation and climate change create 
ever more competition for the planet’s scarce resources. Hopefully, future re-
search efforts focused on identifying resources that are susceptible to mass en-
titlement shifting and more clearly defining property entitlements in those re-
sources will help to ensure that the nation’s vast wealth of assets is allocated in 
just and efficient ways in the years to come. 
 
 
 
 
